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Abstract 
 
The state tax apportionment formula used to determine state taxes is a function of the taxable 
income attributable to the state and state corporate tax rates. In this study, we rely on changes 
in state corporate income tax rates and other inducements across time and states as a quasi-
natural experiment to examine the effect of state taxation on corporate headquarters (HQ) 
relocation. We find that changes in HQ state corporate income tax rates significantly affect 
the likelihood of cross-state HQ relocation. Other inducements also reduce the likelihood of 
relocation. The results of the cross-sectional analysis suggest that the likelihood of HQ 
relocation is less affected by changes in HQ state corporate tax rates when (i) the state-level 
factor weights used to determine income attributable to the state favor property and payroll 
and (ii) the firm engages in tax planning to reduce taxable income. We contribute to the 
literature on corporate tax planning by providing further evidence of how state taxation 
policies affect real corporate decisions that have significant economic consequences for the 
state.  
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1. Introduction 
A recent joint report by the Tax Foundation and KPMG, Location Matters: The State 
Tax Costs of Doing Business, states the following: “State and local taxes represent a 
significant business cost for corporations operating in the U.S. and can have a material effect 
on net operating margins. Consequently, business location decisions for new manufacturing 
facilities, corporate HQ relocations, and the like are often influenced by assessments of 
relative tax burdens across multiple states” (Tax Foundation and KPMG, 2015, p. 1). To 
maximize the value of the firm, managers are expected to pursue opportunities to reduce tax 
liabilities as long as the expected incremental benefits exceed the incremental cost (Slemrod, 
2004; Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin, 2014). In the U.S., 
important features of the fiscal system are that state governments have significant autonomy 
over tax and spending decisions and that the state tax apportionment system distributes state 
tax revenue across the states (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock, 
2013; Tax Foundation and KPMG, 2015).1  
The state tax apportionment system allocates corporate income based on inputs, 
property and payroll, and output and sales. This system makes a firm’s HQ location a 
significant consideration in terms of overall state tax planning because the amount of the 
taxes to be paid to the state government is a function of the headquarters’ property and 
payroll in the state.2 Given the relative stickiness of corporate tax rates, any change in the 
corporate tax rate can cumulatively result in a significant difference in firm value because of 
the effect on the firm’s state tax burden over time. At the same time, where a firm locates its 
HQ can have significant economic effects on the local community, including job creation and 
                                                 
1 We provide a more detailed discussion of the state tax apportionment system/formula in Section 2.2. This 
system essentially determines the taxes that each state receives from the overall taxable income of the firm. 
2 Corporate headquarters are typically associated with significant expenditures on office buildings and payroll, 
as they are home to a firm’s top management and executives. Details of the state tax apportionment system are 
provided in Section 2.  
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knowledge spillover benefits (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993; Garcia-Mila and 
McGuire, 2002). Hence, how state tax policies affect HQ location is an important question. 
However, a major challenge in examining how HQ relocation decisions are affected by state 
tax policies is the empirical identification of the effects of such policies. For example, using 
the state effective tax rate of a firm as a proxy for the net effect of state taxation policies on 
the firm is confounded by the effect of the operating and tax planning activities of the firm on 
both this tax rate and the HQ location.   
To examine the effects of state taxation policies on HQ relocation, we follow Heider 
and Ljungqvist (2015) and rely on variations in HQ state corporate tax rates across time and 
across states as quasi-experiments.3 We also consider the effects of other corporate 
inducements awarded by the state to these corporations. We focus on these state corporate tax 
policies as the setting for our research question for three important reasons. First, the 
staggered nature of state corporate tax rate changes provides a set of counterfactuals of how 
HQ relocations would have occurred in the absence of changes in the tax rate, helping us to 
disentangle the effects of state taxation policies from other push/pull factors driving the 
relocations (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). Second, we explicitly incorporate the growing use 
of other corporation-specific tax benefits that states grant to their current and future residents. 
Third, the state corporate tax rate is embedded explicitly in the state tax apportionment 
formula, providing a theoretical basis for cross-sectional predictions about how other 
important determining factors of a firm’s HQ state tax burden, such as the HQ state tax factor 
weights and the firm’s state tax planning, may moderate the firm’s HQ relocation decision 
subsequent to a HQ state corporate tax rate change. While we focus on HQ state corporate 
income tax rate changes and other benefits, we control for contemporaneous changes in other 
state tax factors in our research design. 
                                                 
3 Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Ljungqvist, Zhang, and Zuo (2016) examine the effects of tax rate changes 
on firms’ leverage choices and corporate risk-taking, respectively. 
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To develop our hypothesis on the effects of changes in the state corporate tax rate on 
HQ relocation, we first assume that prior to any change in state corporate tax rates, a firm’s 
HQ location is determined by the cost–benefit tradeoffs of being in one location versus 
others. For example, some firms locate their HQ in a high-tax state in exchange for access to 
a highly skilled labor force. Firms consider relocating their HQ only when the marginal 
benefits of doing so exceed the marginal costs. All else being equal, a decrease in the state 
corporate tax rate would make the current state more desirable and would thus reduce the net 
benefits of HQ relocation to other states. Similarly, the receipt of greater corporation-specific 
tax benefits will reduce both the likelihood of relocating directly and the effect of any tax rate 
increases. However, the relation between changes in the state corporate rate and the 
likelihood of HQ relocation is not uniform across firms. The sensitivity of HQ relocation 
likelihood to changes in the state corporate tax rate is affected by factors at the state, firm, 
and state-firm levels, such as the features of the tax system of the state (e.g., the state tax 
apportionment formula) and the firm’s existing tax planning activities. 
Because our research design relies on shocks to state corporate tax rates and changes 
in HQ locations, our design maps well onto the above conceptual framework of disruptions to 
location equilibrium that alter the likelihood of relocation. Using a sample of relocating and 
non-relocating firms between 1998 and 2010, we first establish a strong and robust positive 
association between HQ state corporate tax rate changes and the likelihood of HQ relocation 
after including extensive controls for other tax-related, economic, and political factors at the 
firm and state levels. This evidence is also robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. 
Economically, the effect is significant. For example, a one-percentage-point decrease in the 
HQ state corporate tax rate will decrease the likelihood of firms relocating their HQ by 21%.4  
                                                 
4 Note that as expected, cross-state HQ relocation is not a common event. The frequency of relocation is less 
than 2% in our sample. 
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We also find that the receipt of other benefits from the HQ state government, such as 
special tax treatment or subsidies, substantially reduces the probability of HQ relocation. For 
example, in the absence of a state tax rate change, receiving a benefit of 1% of pretax income 
reduces the likelihood of moving by 66%. Finally, we find that the effects of the two state tax 
policy options are related: the receipt of corporation-specific tax benefits reduces the relation 
between state tax rate changes and the likelihood of HQ relocation. 
After establishing the baseline results discussed above, we conduct several analyses to 
examine the effects in greater depth. First, we use an indicator variable approach to consider 
the effects of increases and decreases of HQ state tax rates separately. The results are 
consistent with our previous finding that increases (decreases) in HQ state tax rates increase 
(decrease) the likelihood of HQ relocation. Second, we restrict our analysis to matching 
treatment firms and control firms (i.e., firms that experience changes in HQ tax rates and 
those do not) that are each within 10 miles of a state border to better control for unobservable 
local conditions. This test exploits the similar economic conditions across state borders while 
tax policies are state-specific. This discontinuity in tax policy allows us to difference away 
any effects from unobserved confounding factors that are centric to certain geographic 
locations. We continue to find that a decrease in the HQ state corporate tax rate leads to a 
decrease in the likelihood of HQ relocation. 
We then examine the variation in the relation between changes in HQ state tax rates 
and HQ relations that is predicted by the unique characteristics of the state tax apportionment 
formula. First, while the formula is standard across all states, states have significant 
discretion over the factor weights under the formula.5 In fact, states have made changes over 
time to the factor weights under this formula to encourage more within-state firm activities. 
                                                 
5 Briefly, the factors used to determine the taxes payable to a state are the relative amounts of sales, payroll, and 
property in the state. However, states have the discretion to weight these factors differently. For example, some 
states have an equal-weighting policy, while others put a 100% weight on the sales factor. More details about 
the implementation of factor weights are provided in Section 2.3. 
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Relying on these cross-state and cross-time variations in factor weights, we find evidence that 
for states with factor weights that favor within-state locations for firms’ activities, the effect 
of corporate tax rate changes on HQ relocation is significantly weaker. Second, we argue that 
the use of aggressive tax planning reduces the state-level taxable income attributed to the 
headquarters, which in turn reduces the effect of any corporate tax rate changes. Consistent 
with this expectation, we find that greater ability to engage in tax planning reduces the 
likelihood of firms relocating their HQ subsequent to corporate tax rate changes. The above 
two results, which are consistent with the implications of the state tax apportionment formula, 
provide further identification of the effects of corporate tax rate changes.  
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it provides a 
comprehensive examination of how taxation policies affect an important real corporate 
decision by incorporating important features of the state corporate tax system, exploiting 
staggered changes in state corporate tax rates, and applying unique HQ relocation data 
(Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Ljungqvist, Zhang, and Zuo, 2016). In their review, Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010) state that while “the effects of taxes on real corporate decisions are at 
times difficult to document, they are important to examine” (p. 42). The relation between 
taxes and business locations has been examined using association-type studies in various 
settings (e.g., Bartik, 1985; Papke, 1991; Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009) and in field and 
survey-based studies (Wilson, 1993; Single, 1999). However, few have focused on providing 
evidence of a causal effect. Noting that previous studies have struggled to demonstrate the 
causal effect of taxes on business activities, Rohlin, Rosenthal, and Ross (2014) examine the 
effect of changes in cross-border differences in state tax conditions on the tendency for new 
establishments to favor one side of a state border over the other.6 Our paper extends the study 
by Rohlin et al. (2014) by investigating how changes in corporate tax rates affect the HQ 
                                                 
6 Because of their research design, Rohlin et al. (2014) had to restrict their analysis to a sample of new and small 
firms that chose to locate close to state borders.  
6 
 
relocation of established publicly listed companies and by broadening their analysis of 
location choices beyond locations close to state borders. One advantage of examining 
relocation decisions rather than initial location decisions is that doing so facilitates an 
identification of what happens when tax shocks disrupt existing equilibrium location 
preferences. Our study is also closely related to that of Voget (2011), who examines how a 
repatriation tax on foreign profits affects the likelihood of multinationals relocating their HQ 
to another country. In contrast and as a complement to Voget (2011), we examine sub-
national taxation policy, focusing on headquarters relocation within the U.S., and provide in-
depth analysis unique to this taxation policy setting. One advantage of examining the effects 
of taxation policies within a country is that it reduces endogeneity concerns arising from 
differences in global economic, social, political, legal, and accounting systems, which could 
be correlated with taxation policies and location preferences. 
Second, our paper adds to the literature on state tax planning. Petroni and Shackelford 
(1995) document evidence consistent with property/casualty insurers structuring their cross-
state expansion to mitigate overall state tax and regulatory costs. Gupta and Mills (2002) 
analytically model firms’ state effective tax rates as a convex function of the number of states 
in which they file tax returns and find that the rates are minimized in 24 states. Dyreng et al. 
(2013) find that the firms that are most likely to implement a common Delaware-based state 
tax avoidance strategy have significantly lower state effective tax rates. To the best of our 
knowledge, our paper is the first to provide comprehensive evidence of state tax planning via 
HQ relocation; this evidence includes the outcomes of the interactions between different 
components within the state tax apportionment formula. Further, we introduce a new element 
by applying data on firm-specific tax benefits from state governments. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We provide background 
information on the state tax apportionment system and develop our hypotheses in Section 2. 
7 
 
We describe our research design and sample in Section 3. We present our results in Section 4 
and describe several supplemental analyses in Section 5. We provide concluding remarks in 
Section 6.  
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1. State corporate tax rate changes and HQ relocation  
Dyreng et al. (2013) and the Tax Foundation and KPMG (2015) provide a useful 
background for multijurisdictional tax planning at the state level. Briefly, when firms expand 
operations into multiple states, state taxation becomes more complex because firms are 
subject to taxation in each state. Each state has its own set of tax policies and applies its own 
tax rates on income earned within its borders. Therefore, when a given firm earns profits in 
different states, each state will compute its share of the profits attributable to activity within 
the state. 
A key structural feature of state corporate income tax in the U.S. is the apportionment 
formula used to subdivide multistate firms’ income among jurisdictions in which they have 
sufficient contact, that is, economic nexuses (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Tax Foundation and 
KPMG, 2015). In general, a corporation’s business income is apportioned among states 
according to the portions of its sales, payroll, and property in each state. In theory, these 
factors fairly reflect the tax attributable to each state. Specifically, a multistate firm’s income 
tax expense x in any particular state i is computed by the following formula: 
                  x𝑖 = {[(𝑤𝑖
𝑆 ×
𝑠𝑖
𝑆
) + (𝑤𝑖
𝐿 ×
𝑙𝑖
𝐿
) + (𝑤𝑖
𝑃 ×
𝑝𝑖
𝑃
)] × 𝜋} × 𝑟𝑖   (1) 
where π is the firm’s U.S. (or worldwide) taxable income; 𝑟𝑖 is the statutory corporate tax rate 
in state i; si, li, and pi are the firm’s sales, payroll, and property in state i, respectively; S, L, 
and P are the firm’s total sales, payroll, and property, respectively; and 𝑤𝑖
𝑆, 𝑤𝑖
𝐿, and 𝑤𝑖
𝑃 are 
the factor weights in state i for sales, payroll, and property, respectively, and these weights 
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sum to one.7 Thus, the term in square brackets is the percentage of a firm’s income taxable in 
state i and the term in curly brackets is the firm’s income taxable in state i. Empirically,  
                                         𝒘𝒊
𝑳 = 𝒘𝒊
𝑷 = 𝟏 𝟐⁄ (𝟏 − 𝒘𝒊
𝑺)                                                (2) 
Substituting (2) into (1) and rearranging leads to the following equation: 
                  𝒙𝒊 = [(𝒘𝒊
𝑺 ×
𝒔𝒊
𝑺
) × 𝝅 + 𝟏 𝟐⁄ (𝟏 − 𝒘𝒊
𝑺) (
𝒍𝒊
𝑳
+
𝒑𝒊
𝑷
) × 𝝅] × 𝒓𝒊  (3) 
As Equation (3) shows, a firm can lower its state tax liability by relocating its HQ to a 
state with a lower tax rate. First, assuming that state i has a lower tax rate, HQ relocation 
increases the proportion of a firm’s payroll and property in the state, 
𝑙𝑖
𝐿
 + 
𝑝𝑖
𝑃
. Keeping all 
other terms within the square brackets constant, this move will increase the percentage of a 
firm’s income taxable at a lower tax rate, ri, and decrease the amount of state taxes the firm 
pays. The effect of HQ relocation on the proportion of a firm’s sales, 
𝑠𝑖
𝑆
, is ambiguous because 
the effect of HQ location on state sales is contingent on many factors, including whether the 
state is an important market for the firm and whether a firm’s HQ location affects customer 
goodwill. In sum, given the apportionment formula, it is clear that even if a firm is already 
operating in state i (e.g., selling goods and services to residents of state i), corporate HQ 
location in state i is strongly related to the firm’s state i tax liability. 
The objective of our study is to examine how changes in HQ state corporate taxes 
influence HQ relocation. The simple framework guiding our analysis is as follows. With 
regard to its HQ location in the current state, we assume that a firm takes into account the 
costs and benefits that arise from the relevant factors (e.g., the availability of a labor force to 
staff its HQ, wages, proximity to its suppliers and customers, and taxes)—that is, we assume 
that the firm is in an “optimal” HQ location equilibrium. We then rely on changes in the 
corporate tax rates in the current state to identify relocation decisions that are likely to be 
caused by the mechanics of the state tax apportionment formula. We argue that a change in 
                                                 
7 A more detailed discussion of the factors is provided in the next section. 
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the HQ state corporate tax rate alters the equilibrium HQ location choice of firms, providing a 
catalyst for firms, especially those that are more sensitive to the state tax burden in the HQ 
state, to consider a potential HQ relocation.8  
In terms of Equation (3), we argue that with a positive derivate of xi with respect to ri, 
when state i increases ri, it increases the likelihood of HQ relocation out of state i. Hence, our 
first hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as follows: 
H1: Changes in state corporate tax rates are positively related to the likelihood of 
corporate HQ relocations out of the state. 
  
 Our next hypothesis focuses on the fact that while an increase in the corporate tax 
rate provides an impetus for HQ relocation, there are other considerations related to the state 
tax environment that might either exacerbate or mitigate the likelihood of doing so. In 
particular, we focus on other firm-specific tax benefits granted to the corporation. We predict 
that these benefits will reduce the likelihood that the firm will relocate directly and reduce the 
effect of any state tax rate changes. In additional analysis, we also consider some factors that 
may affect the relation between changes in corporate tax rates and the current HQ location 
equilibrium. In particular, the state tax apportionment formula predicts the interaction effects 
between state corporate tax rates, factor weights, and taxable income. These tests are 
important because the findings provide further evidence that the main tests of Hypothesis H1 
indeed document the effects of our variables of interest.  
2.2. The effect of firm-specific special tax treatments or subsidies from the HQ state 
State governments sometimes provide special tax incentives for firms to attract or 
retain business activities within the state. Over the past three decades, state and local 
governments in the U.S. have awarded corporations more than $64 billion in subsidy 
                                                 
8 As noted in the introduction, the fact that many migration factors exist and might be unobservable/non-
measurable by the researcher could result in significant endogeneity concerns. A firm chooses the location of its 
headquarters on the basis of several possibly correlated factors. Hence, relying on an analysis that focuses on a 
disruption to the location equilibrium and controlling for observable factors helps to mitigate such concerns.  
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packages designed to encourage investment and the creation or retention of jobs (Mattera, 
Tarczynska, and LeRoy, 2013). Tax breaks are a common type of financial incentive given to 
companies by state and local governments to encourage the growth of business activity and 
job creation within their borders. This type of deal began in the late 1970s, when state and 
local officials in Pennsylvania put together a package worth about $100 million to persuade 
Volkswagen to build an its first assembly plant in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. 
Since the 1980s, large packages have been awarded to many of the largest and best-known 
companies in the U.S. and to foreign companies doing business there. Mattera et al. (2013) 
show that 16 of the Fortune 50 companies received special deals from state and local 
governments. For example, it is reported that General Motors was offered $2.1 billion in 
MEGA tax credits over a 20-year period by Michigan in 2009 to encourage within-state 
investments and job creation (Livengood, 2015). Other examples include Oregon’s efforts to 
retain Nike (Huffington Post, 2012). On this issue, Good Jobs First (2012, 12), reports: 
In some instances, companies are awarded large deals after they threaten to 
leave the state, or at least let it be known that they are considering such a 
move. For example, last year Nike got the state of Oregon to guarantee that it 
could enjoy single sales factor tax breaks for 30 years after warning that it 
might otherwise move some of its operations elsewhere. The agreement was 
worth an estimated $2 billion to the company. Nike was following in the 
footsteps of various media and financial companies that engaged in job 
blackmail in New York City in the 1980s and 1990s, and firms such as Sears 
Holdings and Motorola Mobility that did the same in Illinois in 2011. 
Hence, because of potential losses of the benefits from the HQ state government upon 
HQ relocation, firms that enjoy special tax treatments or receive subsidies from their HQ 
state government are less likely to engage in HQ relocation. This leads us to our second 
hypothesis: 
H2: Special tax treatments or subsidies from the HQ state government are negatively 
related to the likelihood of corporate HQ relocations out of the state. 
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In addition to the direct relation between special benefits and the likelihood of 
relocation, we also predict that the relocations of benefits-receiving firms are less strongly 
related to tax rate changes during the period of special tax benefits. That is, special tax 
benefits will reduce or moderate the positive relation between corporate tax rate changes and 
HQ relocation likelihood. However, there may not be a moderating effect, on average, 
because tax rate changes are both increasing and decreasing. For increases in tax rates, 
special tax benefits may offset the effects of the rate increase; however, for decreases in tax 
rates, it is unclear if the two tax features are complements or substitutes or if they are simply 
additive. This leads us to our third hypothesis: 
H3: The positive association between a change in the HQ corporate tax rate and the 
likelihood of HQ relocation is moderated for firms that receive special tax treatments 
or subsidies from the HQ state government. 
 
2.3. Additional Cross-sectional Analysis  
2.3.1. The moderating effect of sales factor weight 
 Equation (3) indicates that the relation between changes in state taxes and changes in 
state corporate tax rates can be moderated by the weight of the sales factor. The Uniform 
Division of Income for Tax Purpose Act (UDITPA), introduced in 1957, proposed a three-
factor model for apportioning the income of a corporation that is taxable in more than one 
state: a sales factor, a property factor, and a payroll factor. However, in Moorman 
Manufacturing Co v. Bair [437 U.S. 267 (1978)], the Supreme Court ruled that a three-factor 
formula was not constitutionally required and that Iowa could use a sales-only apportionment 
formula. With each state free to choose the weights of the apportionment factors, the sum of a 
corporation’s income attributed to its nexus states rarely equals its total income. 
One common critique of equally weighting the three components in the state tax 
apportionment formula is that it creates a disincentive for capital investment and job creation 
12 
 
in the state (Weiner, 1999). Since 1978, many states have increased the weight of the sales 
factor, with some relying on it completely. As discussed in Griffith (2014), this change has 
reduced tax burdens for businesses that have most of their property and payroll in the state 
but only a small proportion of their national sales in the state and has increased tax burdens 
for out-of-state companies that have minimal property or payroll in the state but a large 
proportion of their national sales in the state. Using panel data from 1978 to 1994, Goolsbee 
and Maydew (2000) document empirical results consistent with this claim. Specifically, 
Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) find that for an average state, cutting the payroll weight from 
one-third to one-quarter leads to a 1.1% increase in manufacturing employment. Using data 
from 1978 to 1995, Goolsbee, Maydew, and Schadewald (2000) show that for Wisconsin, 
switching from a double-weighed sales formula to a single-factor sales apportionment 
formula would have resulted in 2.9% and 2.4% growth in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing employment, respectively. Gupta and Hofmann (2003) find that new capital 
expenditures by corporations in the manufacturing sector are decreasing in the income tax 
burden on property (the product of the corporate tax rate and the property factor weight). 
On the basis of the state tax apportionment formula, there is an intuitive link between 
the weight on the sales factor and relocation-related tax savings. Assume that the weight on 
the sales factor for a state is 100% and that the weights on the payroll and property factors are 
0%. Further assume that having HQ in the state affects the amounts of property and payroll 
but not the amount of sales in the state. It can be observed from the formula that an increase 
in the state corporate tax rate does not create incentives to decrease the amounts of property 
and payroll in the state because the apportionment formula weights for these amounts are 
zero. In other words, the tax savings from relocating out of the state are limited because the 
taxable income in the state is not a function of property and payroll. More generally, 
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conditional on an increase in the corporate tax rate in a state, a higher weight on the sales 
factor reduces incentives to move out of the state.  
This outcome is consistent with the objectives of states that increase the weight of the 
sales factor to encourage firms to locate in their states (Tax Foundation and KPMG, 2015). 
Many states have reasoned that placing more weight on the sales factor provides state tax 
relief to businesses that have significant property and payroll in the state, thereby rewarding 
those businesses (Griffith, 2014). Our first supplemental test focuses on the interaction 
between tax rate changes and factor weights. 
2.3.2. The moderating effect of tax planning 
Referring to Equation (3), beyond the factor weights, another key determinant of state 
taxes is the amount of taxable income. For example, if a firm is able to maintain a very low 
level of income that is subject to tax in the headquartered state, then any change in the state 
corporate tax rate will have a minimal effect on its state tax liability. Research suggests that 
firms can influence this component via tax planning activities (Dyreng et al., 2009; Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010; Dyreng et al., 2013). Hence, to provide a richer analysis of the 
interaction between the different components of the state tax apportionment formula, we 
focus on taxable income. In particular, given that taxable income is not publicly observable, 
we examine the role of actions that could reduce this component. 
Research has examined how aggressive tax planning affects corporate decisions 
related to capital structure (Graham and Tucker, 2006), debt financing choice (Hasan, Hoi, 
Wu, and Zhang, 2014), and the location of subsidiaries and holding companies (Dyreng et al., 
2013; Dyreng, Lindsey, Markle, and Shackelford, 2015). Our analyses of tax planning 
activities are unique in that we examine how existing tax planning activities affect a firm’s 
likelihood of HQ relocation when there is an exogenous change in HQ state corporate tax 
rates. These analyses rely on the fact that state taxes are a function of the interaction between 
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corporate tax rates and taxable income. Thus, for any given level of HQ state corporate tax 
rate change, firms with a lower amount of taxable income would be less affected by the 
change in corporate tax rates, and the total tax savings would be less likely to subsume the 
non-tax costs of HQ relocation. Hence, our second cross-sectional test focuses on the 
interaction between tax rate changes and existing corporate tax planning opportunities. 
 
3. Empirical Design 
3.1. Sample selection 
We select our sample based on several criteria. First, to identify corporate relocation 
within the U.S., we rely on information on firms’ HQ location based on the disclosed 
business address on their annual 10-K filings. We obtain the data on firms’ HQ locations 
from Professor McDonald’s website.9 While the data include all filings from 1994 to 2010, 
because the SEC did not require online filing until May 1996, the number of observations in 
the dataset is much smaller (and biased toward larger firms) for 1994 and 1995.10 There is 
also limited data availability for the construction of control variables in earlier years, so we 
begin the sample period in 1998. We do not use location data from Compustat because 
Compustat reports the address of a firm’s current HQ location and backfills this information 
for previous years.  
To be included in the sample, each firm-year observation is required to have financial 
information available from the Compustat database and the necessary state-level information 
available from a variety of sources, such as the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the 
websites of state governments. We further restrict the sample to non-financial firms (SIC 
6000–6999). We exclude firm-years that engage in merger and acquisition (M&A) activities 
                                                 
9 http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10-K_Headers/10-K_Headers.html. To determine the location of a firm’s 
headquarters, all of the fields appearing in the headers of 10-K forms (including 10-K405, 10KSB, and 
10KSB40 forms) were parsed. 
10 The Edgar online filing system was gradually phased in during 1994–1998. 
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within two years preceding the state corporate income tax rate changes to reduce concerns 
that HQ relocations are driven by M&A activities.11 This leaves us with a final sample of 
7,252 firms and 36,019 firm-year observations for our sample period. We obtain the data on 
changes in state corporate income tax rates from Heider and Ljungqvist (2015).12 For ease of 
reference, we have included the list of states that have changed their corporate tax rates and 
the number of firms (within our sample) in each state when the changes occurred in 
Appendix A. We refer readers to Appendix A of Heider and Ljungqvist (2015, p. 709) for 
more detailed information about these changes. 
3.2. Empirical design and identification 
We use a difference-in-difference approach to identify the effect of corporate tax rate 
increases on HQ relocation. Figure 1 provides a timeline of our measurements. We examine 
the effect of corporate tax rate changes in a state in year t-1 on HQ relocating out of the state 
in the following year.13 We lag all of our independent variables by one year to mitigate the 
concern that corporate relocation decisions may drive changes in tax policies. To the extent 
that firms relocate in anticipation of tax rate increases or take more than one year to complete 
relocation after tax rate increases, the likelihood of a significant association between 
corporate tax rate changes and HQ relocation is reduced. Specifically, we estimate the 
following regression: 
 𝐻𝑄 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Δ𝐻𝑄 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1 
                                                                                  +𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡                                        (4) 
                                                 
11 Our conclusions are not affected if we include these firm-year observations and control for whether a firm 
engages in M&A activities. 
12 To identify the changes, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) use data obtained from the Tax Foundation, the Book 
of the States, by searching the “Current Corporate Income Tax Developments” feature published periodically in 
the Journal of State Taxation, and from state codes accessed through Lexis-Nexis. In states with more than one 
tax bracket, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) report the change to the top bracket. 
13 It is important to note that the firm might already have expectations of the tax change before year t-1 because 
of deliberations on the tax change in earlier years. We focus on the year of the actual change in corporate tax 
rates to be consistent with Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and to avoid having to make judgments about the 
likelihood of the passage of a change based on deliberations. 
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where i, s, and t index firms, states, and years, respectively, and 𝐻𝑄 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is an 
indicator equal to one if a firm relocates its HQ to another state between year t-1 and year t, 
and zero otherwise. Note that relocation is, by construction, a change variable. 
Δ𝐻𝑄 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1 is the change in the firm’s HQ state corporate income tax 
rate from year t-2 to year t-1. Control denotes a vector of control variables measured at t-1. 
FE denotes the different fixed effects that we include in the regression. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level according to the state in which the HQ is located at time t-1.  
A major advantage of this design is that it helps to mitigate omitted correlated 
variable biases, an important empirical concern because relocation decisions are endogenous 
to many possibly correlated factors. In addition to first differencing, removing unobserved 
stable firm effects, staggered changes in corporate tax rates across states helps to create a set 
of counterfactuals (i.e., matched firms that experience different tax amounts, including no 
changes in corporate tax rates) to better test our hypotheses of how “tax shocks” to HQ state 
corporate tax rates affect relocation decisions (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). The use of fixed 
effects also helps to mitigate concerns that our results are affected by various omitted 
invariant factors. Hence, there are likely to be fewer endogeneity concerns with our research 
design compared to a regression specification that examines location characteristics and the 
level of corporate tax rates. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that changes in corporate tax rates are not random and 
hence are not pure shocks to the equilibrium HQ location decision. For example, such 
changes might be correlated with other macroeconomic state factors that could drive 
relocation decisions. To further address concerns of endogeneity, we include an extensive 
array of controls that could be associated with changes in state tax rates and corporate HQ 
relocation. Specifically, we include four sets of variables to control for 1) various other state 
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tax policies that might coincide with changes in state corporate tax policies; 2) firm-level 
characteristics; 3) state economic conditions; and 4) state political factors. 
3.3. Control variables         
3.3.1 Control variables related to other state tax policies 
While we focus on changes in corporate tax rates to better determine the causal effect 
of tax rates on HQ relocation, it is possible that concurrent changes in other state tax policies 
drive changes in both corporate tax rates and corporate relocations. For example, changes in 
corporate tax rates may coincide with changes in personal income tax rates and the provision 
of state job tax credits (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). To address the concern that firms 
relocate as a response to other policies as opposed to changes in corporate tax rates and that 
these polices are correlated with changes in corporate tax rates, we control for an array of 
state tax policies: a high apportionment factor on sales, an R&D tax credit rate, the 
availability of job creation tax credits, a bonus depreciation deduction rate, and concurrent 
changes in personal tax rates and capital gain tax rates. While all of these policies are worthy 
of examination, in this study, motivated by the dynamics of the state tax apportionment 
formula, we focus on changes in corporate tax rates.  
While we focus on changes in corporate tax rates to better identify the effect of tax 
rates on HQ relocation, it is possible that the levels of state corporate tax rates can also affect 
decisions to relocate. For example, it could be argued that firms facing higher tax burdens are 
more likely at any point in time to move to avoid higher taxes. Hence, we control for the level 
of the state corporate income tax rate (Corporate Tax Rate). Controlling for this income tax 
rate also mitigates concerns that the likelihood of moving to a state with lower corporate tax 
rates is a function of where the state lies in the distribution of state corporate tax rates.  
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3.3.2 Control variables related to firm-level characteristics 
 Tax changes may affect the tax shield benefits that a firm can derive from debt 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Consistent with the tax shield making debt more attractive 
than equity as a source of financing, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) find that leverage 
increases following increases in the corporate tax rates. Hence, we control for changes in 
leverage (∆Leverage). A great deal of tax planning involves subsidiaries or operations in 
foreign countries (Markle and Shackelford, 2014), and we account for this by controlling for 
changes in the amount of pre-tax foreign income (∆Foreign). We also control for changes in 
various firm-level variables that could affect corporate tax decisions (Hines and Rice, 1994; 
Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009; Rohlin et al., 2014; Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015): changes in 
profitability and revenue (∆ROA and ∆Sales), ∆Firm Size as measured by changes in the log 
of total assets, changes in growth opportunities (∆Market-to-Book), and changes in both 
tangible and intangible investment (∆R&D, ∆PPE and ∆Intangibles). Dyreng et al. (2013) 
find that parent incorporation in Delaware increases the likelihood of utilizing subsidiaries in 
Delaware to avoid state taxes and that this Delaware-based state tax avoidance strategy 
lowers state ETR by 1.1%. We control for this effect through a Delaware incorporation 
dummy (Delaware).14 Finally, to mitigate the concern that corporate relocation is an artifact 
of corporate restructuring, we control for whether a firm engaged in restructuring activities in 
year t-1.15 
                                                 
14 We examine the role of state tax avoidance through the use of a passive investment company (PIC) in a cross-
sectional analysis later in the paper. 
15 As a robustness check, we control for a firm’s extant state income tax burden by including in the regression its 
state effective tax rate, which is calculated as the ratio of the current state tax expense divided by the non-
negative pre-tax domestic income (or pre-tax worldwide income if domestic income is missing). We do not 
control for firm-level state ETR in the main tests because doing so would significantly reduce the sample size to 
18,488 firm-year observations (firm-level state ETR sample mean = 5.05%). This is mainly because of the 
presence of loss firms and the availability of state tax expense information. Our results are robust to the 
inclusion of firm-level state ETR as an additional control variable, and the coefficients on state ETR are not 
statistically different from zero in the regressions. 
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3.3.3 Control variables related to state economic conditions 
States may change taxes because of changes in local economic conditions; 
specifically, they may change corporate income taxes because of local demand shocks or 
other changes in their economic conditions. To the extent that these economic conditions also 
affect firms’ relocation propensity, any observed correlation between tax and relocation 
likelihood could be spurious. To mitigate this concern, we add controls for state-level 
economic conditions.  
First, we control for changes in state-level economic conditions using the state-level 
real GSP growth rate (∆Real GSP) and the unemployment rate and benefits (∆Unemployment 
Rate and ∆Unemployment Benefits). Second, HQ relocations could also be affected by 
variations in labor market conditions. To address this, we control for state-level unionization 
rates (∆Unionization). Third, examining factors affecting the state tax apportionment 
formula, Omer and Shelley (2004) suggest that capital mobility, state wealth, and personal 
income may influence state tax policy changes. Following Omer and Shelley (2004), we 
measure capital mobility (Immobile Capital) by the ratio of the total gross state product from 
the agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and mining industries to the total state private industry 
GSP (Omer and Shelley, 2004). We measure state wealth and personal income using four 
different variables (Omer and Shelley, 2004): State Private GSP, State-to-Region Private 
GSP, State-to-Nation Personal Income, and State-to-Region Personal Income. As defined in 
detail in Appendix B, State Private GSP and State-to-Nation Personal Income are residuals 
orthogonal to the state’s immobile capital to reduce the multicollinearity problem. Finally, 
following Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), we control for the state’s budgetary status and fiscal 
health by controlling for the level of budget deficit or surplus (Budget Deficit and Budget 
Surplus), changes in the credit rating of state government-issued bonds (∆Credit Ratings), 
and whether a state received credit downgrades during year t-1 (Credit Downgrades). 
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3.3.4 Control variables related to state political factors  
State political considerations may affect tax policies such as the state corporate tax 
rate. Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) provide detailed political background for each major 
corporate tax change examined in our sample.16 They find that none of the corporate tax 
changes appears to be driven by the lobbying activities of any particular firms, reducing the 
reserve causality concerns that states change their tax rates to attract particular firms. Instead, 
Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) find that state corporate tax policies changes are related to 
election cycles, the governor’s political affiliation, and the state’s budget balance. For 
example, the election cycle is the largest determinant of tax cuts. Tax cuts are 6% more likely 
in the year before an election than in other years.   
Similarly, Omer and Shelley (2004) find that changes in state tax policies are 
associated with the governor’s party affiliation. Furthermore, states that obtain a higher 
percentage of their budget from corporate and property tax revenues are less likely to change 
their corporate tax rates. We control for election cycles by the number of years until the next 
state election (Years to State Election). We measure the governor’s party affiliation by an 
indicator that takes a value of one if the state governor is a Democrat (Democratic Governor). 
We measure state tax dependence by the ratio of the total corporate income and property tax 
collection to the total state tax revenue (Tax Dependence). States may limit tax law changes 
by passing supermajority constitutional amendments. Knight (2000) finds that states with 
supermajority provisions are associated with lower tax rates. We control for whether a state 
passes a supermajority provision (Supermajority Vote). Finally, to mitigate concerns that 
states change corporate tax policy as a response to “beauty contests” with neighboring states, 
we control for the number of bordering states (No of Bordering States), the statutory tax rate 
                                                 
16 Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) provide this information in the internet appendix of their SSRN working paper. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2024200 
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differential with neighboring states (Bordering States Tax Diff), and whether neighboring 
states increase or decrease tax (Bordering States Tax Increase/Decrease). 
3.3.5 Fixed effects 
In addition to including a large array of firm- and state-level controls, we incorporate 
different sets of fixed effects to further mitigate concerns arising from omitted variable bias. 
For most of our analyses, we present two sets of results, each controlling for a different set of 
fixed effects. The first specification incorporates industry (two-digit SIC classification), state 
of location, and year fixed effects. Industry fixed effects are included to control for the cross-
sectional variation in relocation propensity due to unobservable industry characteristics.17 For 
example, industry merger waves could drive the clustering of corporate HQ, and industry 
fixed effects would absorb these effects in our estimation. Year fixed effects are included to 
control for any systematic temporal effects on firms’ relocation likelihood that are unrelated 
to changes in tax rates. State fixed effects are included to further account for unobservable 
variations in business conditions and environments across states. 
The second specification uses firm and year fixed effects. Firm fixed effects are 
included so that the resulting empirical specification relies primarily on within-firm (i.e., 
time-series) variation in firms’ exposure to changes in corporate tax rates. The sample used in 
the last set of analyses with firm fixed effects is significantly smaller, mainly because all of 
the included firms must relocate their HQ during our sample period.  
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the number of cross-state HQ relocations over the sample period of 
1998 to 2010. We find a total of 661 instances of such relocation during our sample period, 
among which 346 firms (53%) relocate to lower-tax states. The most incidences happened in 
2000, when 72 firms relocated their HQ, and on average, about 2% of the firms relocated 
                                                 
17 Our results are similar if we use other industry classifications (the Fama–French 48-industry classification or 
two-digit NAICS). 
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their HQ each year. These corporate relocations do not appear to be clustered at any time 
corresponding with any merger waves or technology changes. 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics. All of the continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The average change in the corporate tax rate in our 
sample is about -0.03%, with a standard deviation of 0.67, suggesting that there are large 
variations in corporate tax rates across states and over time. In the sample, 54% of the firms 
are incorporated in Delaware. Untabulated results show that the univariate correlations 
between the different control variables are low. Nevertheless, we also run checks in our later 
regression analysis to ensure that multicollinearity does not significantly affect our results. 
4. Results 
4.1. Test of H1: The effects of corporate tax changes on HQ relocation 
Table 3 provides the results for our first hypothesis, which predicts a positive 
association between the corporate tax rate changes and the likelihood of HQ relocation. The 
three columns report estimates for relocation propensity using different fixed effects and 
probability models. Column 1 reports our main specification, where we use a logit model 
with industry, state, and year fixed effects. The coefficient on ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate is 
0.187 and is statistically significant, with a p-value smaller than 0.01. This result implies that 
firms that experience a decrease (an increase) in their HQ state corporate income tax rate are 
less (more) likely to relocate their HQ to another state. In assessing the economic magnitude, 
the logit coefficient of 0.187 suggests that a one-percentage-point decrease in the HQ state 
corporate tax rate will reduce the likelihood of a firm’s relocating its HQ by 20.6%.18  
Moving to the control variables, we find that more profitable firms are associated with 
a higher likelihood of HQ relocation. This is not surprising because for these firms, higher 
                                                 
18 exp(0.187) - 1 = 0.206. We also calculated the average marginal effect of ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate to be 
0.0033, implying that a one-percentage-point decrease in HQ corporate tax rate will lead to a 17.9% drop in HQ 
relocation likelihood (-0.0033/0.0184)*100.  
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corporate tax savings are likely to outweigh the relocation costs. We find that growing firm 
size and revenue are positively associated with the likelihood of HQ relocation. One 
explanation for this result is that growing firms—that is, those increasing in firm size and 
generating more revenue—are more likely to be further from equilibrium because of 
expanding geographic activity. We also find that HQ relocation is more likely when firms 
have less tangible assets and more intangible investments. We note that most of the state-
level control variables are not significant in any of the specifications. One likely reason is the 
inclusion of year and, more importantly, state fixed effects to control for the cross-sectional 
variation in these variables, which exhibit small time-series variations.   
 We obtain similar results when we use a linear probability model, as shown in 
Column 2. We present the results with the linear probability model to check the robustness of 
our results to the incidental parameters problem and to facilitate our interpretation of 
interaction effects in our later analysis (Angrist, 2001). As shown in Column 3, we check 
whether our results are robust to a logit model with firm and year fixed effects, which help to 
control for unobserved time-invariant firm factors that could drive both state corporate tax 
changes and HQ relocations. Our results remain robust and significant despite a significant 
reduction in the sample size from 36,019 to 3,473 observations because of the removal of 
observations with no within-firm variation from the sample in the specification with firm 
fixed effects. Overall, the evidence in Table 3 provides strong evidence that a decrease (an 
increase) in corporate tax rates will reduce (increase) the likelihood of HQ relocation. 
4.2. Test of H2 and H3: The effect of firm-specific special tax treatments from the HQ state 
The state income tax burden could be mitigated when firms receive or are in a 
bargaining position to receive special tax treatment from state and local governments. Over 
our sample period, we hand-collected information on firm-specific packages provided by 
state governments, including job creation tax credits and subsidies, The data were collected 
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from Good Jobs First’s Subsidy Tracker database (GJFST);19 they consist of official data 
provided by state and local governments. States provide the data mainly to increase 
accountability regarding state economic development subsidies. GJFST supplements the 
official data using a variety of information from other sources, including government and 
corporate press releases, newspaper articles, and reports on specific projects to provide 
information on subsidy amounts, company information, the status and timing of awards, job 
outcomes, wage outcomes, and project information. The disclosure of company-specific data 
on economic development subsidies is becoming an increasingly common practice among 
state governments (Mattera et al., 2013). Among the 7,052 firms in our final sample, fewer 
than 14% (969 firms) received special tax treatments or subsidies from state or local 
governments, and only 590 received packages valued $100,000 or more (total amount). The 
value of the special tax treatments is highly skewed, with a median value of $195,737, a 
mean of $3.9 million, and a maximum value of $3.2 billion.  
To test our hypotheses H2 and H3, we define our variable of firm-specific subsidies 
from the HQ state government in the following way: first, we calculate the annual value of 
the benefits using the total value divided by the duration of the tax benefits (in years). We 
then define Scaled Benefits from HQ State, our variable used in the regressions, as the annual 
value as a percent of the firm’s pre-tax domestic income multiplied by 100.20 As tabulated in 
Table 2, Scaled Benefits from HQ has a sample mean (standard deviation) of 0.023 (0.133). 
The small sample mean is due to the small proportion of sample firms receiving the benefits. 
In a subsample of benefit-receiving firm-years, the mean (standard deviation) of Scaled 
                                                 
19 www.goodjobsfirst.org 
20 This definition roughly mirrors ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate, which was used to test H1. As explained in detail 
in the Variable Definitions in Appendix B, we use pre-tax worldwide income as the scaler for Scaled Benefits 
from HQ State if pre-tax domestic income is missing. Observations with a negative denominator are coded as 
zero (273 observations or 0.76% of the sample). We obtain similar results if such observations are coded as 
missing.  Twenty percent of the subsidy packages do not have duration information. For such deals, we employ 
the duration of comparable subsidy packages (i.e., those of the same type, of similar total subsidy value, and if 
available, offered by the same state) in the analyses. The results are similar if exclude the subsidy firms with 
undisclosed subsidy duration. 
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Benefits from HQ State is 0.339 (0.384), suggesting that on average, the annual benefits for 
the benefit-receiving firms is about 0.34% of pre-tax domestic income.21  
The results are reported in Table 4. Consistent with our hypothesis H2, we find that 
the coefficients on Scaled Benefits from HQ State are negative across all three specifications. 
In terms of economic significance, the average marginal effect of Scaled Benefits from HQ 
State from the logit regression is -0.027 (not tabulated). Considering that the average HQ 
relocation probability is 1.84%, the effect of special tax benefits on reducing the likelihood of 
HQ relocation is substantial. Our results imply that firms’ relocation likelihood is 
significantly attenuated by the amount of benefits derived from local governments  
The coefficients on the interaction term between ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate and Scaled 
Benefits from HQ State are negative and significant across all three specifications at the 10% 
level. The evidence is consistent with our hypothesis H3 that the special tax benefits 
moderate the positive association between corporate tax changes and HQ relocation 
likelihood. The interaction effect (ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate Scaled×Benefits from HQ State) 
is negative and significant, with a marginal effect of -0.0089 and z-statistics of -3.82 (not 
tabulated).22 Taken together, the main and interaction effects imply that annual special tax 
benefits of about 0.1% of pre-tax domestic income would be able to offset the increase in HQ 
relocation likelihood induced by a 1% corporate tax rate increase. In sum, our findings 
suggest that special tax treatment from the local governments is a useful tool in retaining 
firms’ headquarters within the state. 
                                                 
21 Subsidies given include mega deals of greater than $75 million (1.5% of the sample); tax credits or rebates 
(40.5%), property tax abatements (15%) or a combination of these (8%); enterprise zones (5%); cost or training 
reimbursements (17%); or grants, low-cost loans, or tax increment financing (13%). 
22 The magnitude and the statistical significance of the interaction effects from the logit models are determined 
following Ai and Norton (2003).   
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4.3 Robustness tests 
Our main results for hypothesis H1 show a strong positive association between state 
corporate tax rate changes and the likelihood of cross-state corporate HQ relocation. To 
further establish that the identified effect is causal, we conduct a series of robustness checks 
below. 
4.3.1 Tax increases vis-à-vis tax decreases 
The analyses we have presented thus far lump positive and negative tax changes 
together by focusing on the magnitude of the tax changes. While this approach allows us to 
quantify the effects of tax rate changes on the likelihood of HQ relocations and simplifies our 
cross-sectional analysis (e.g., easing exposition and mitigating multicollinearity concerns due 
to having many interaction terms), it ignores the differential sensitivity of relocation 
decisions to tax increases vis-à-vis tax decreases. In this section, we explore whether firms 
respond differently to a HQ state tax increase or decrease. Specifically, we re-estimate 
Equation (4), replacing ΔHQ Corporate Tax with two indicators, HQ Tax Increase and HQ 
Tax Decrease, which equal one if a state increases or decreases, respectively, the statutory tax 
rate in year t-1, and zero otherwise.23  
       𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑄 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑄 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1 
                                                               +𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡                                                          (5) 
As shown in Panel A of Table 5, the results for all three specifications (logit, linear 
probability, and conditional logit) indicate a statistically significant increase (decrease) in the 
tendency to relocate following increases (decreases) in corporate tax rates. The coefficients 
on HQ Tax Increase and HQ Tax Decrease are positive and negative, respectively, and both 
are statistically significant across all specifications. Note that the coefficients on HQ Tax 
                                                 
23 In the dummy variable approach in Equation (5), we include two additional HQ state tax change events (i.e, 
the suspension of the NOL deduction in California in 2002 and the introduction of AMT in New Jersey in 2002) 
as tax increase events (Tax Increase = 1), which is consistent with the approach in Heider and Ljungqvist 
(2015). These tax increase events are not included in our main analysis because they cannot be quantifiable to a 
rate change for the continuous dependent variable. 
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Decrease are larger in magnitude than those on HQ Tax Increase. This is not surprising 
because, on average, tax cuts are smaller than tax increases. Using the logit model to gauge 
the economic magnitude, the coefficient of -1.7 on HQ Tax Decrease implies that the 
likelihood of relocation decreases by 81.9% after a tax cut.24 In other words, a tax cut can, on 
average, persuade more than four out of five “relocating” firms to remain in their current state 
relative to a no-tax-cut scenario. 
4.3.2 Parallel trends assumption 
In general, a differences-in-differences research design estimates the difference in an 
outcome (i.e., the dependent variable) around an event of interest between two groups of 
firms that differ in the extent to which they are affected by the event. The difference between 
the changes (or “differences”) experienced by the two groups of firms provides an estimate of 
the causal effect of the event on the outcome.  
The crucial assumption of a differences-in-differences research design is that the two 
groups of firms would have continued to exhibit the same time trend in the outcome but for 
the occurrence of the event. This parallel trends assumption facilitates inferences about the 
causal effect of the event by allowing the relatively less affected group to be used as a 
counterfactual against which to compare the relatively more affected group.  
To assess the validity of this assumption, we examine whether firms with different 
levels of exposure to state tax changes did, in fact, exhibit parallel trends before the event. In 
particular, we estimate a specification that is analogous to Eq. (3) except that we include the 
leads and lags of the variables 𝐻𝑄 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1 and 𝐻𝑄 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1.
25 
We present the results of this specification in Table 5, Panel B. None of the point 
estimates for the lead terms are statistically significant at conventional levels, which is 
consistent with the maintained assumption that firms with different levels of exposure to state 
                                                 
24 [exp(-1.709) – 1] = -0.819. 
25 A similar specification is used in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015). 
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tax changes exhibit similar or parallel trends. This provides further evidence that changes in 
HQ state corporate tax rates affect the likelihood of corporate HQ relocation.  
4.3.3 Border state analysis 
The second requirement for our identification strategy is that state corporate income 
tax changes do not coincide systematically with variations in local business cycles or other 
state-level policies or conditions. To the extent that local shocks independently affect firms’ 
operation decisions, some or all of the relocation choices may reflect the effects of a local 
economic shock that is spuriously correlated with corporate tax changes. For example, if 
states raise taxes in economic downturns and such economic downturns motivate firms to 
relocate, we would observe a spurious correlation between taxes and relocations. 
Our specifications have already controlled for an extensive array of observed state 
economic and political conditions and policies. In addition, our specifications incorporate 
industry and state fixed effects to rule out the concern that our results are driven by correlated 
time-invariant factors that are unobservable at the industry or state level.  
To further address concerns that unobserved changes in local economic conditions 
might affect the likelihood of corporate HQ relocation for reasons unrelated to the tax change 
itself, we restrict our sample to firms whose HQ are located in a border region. This test 
exploits the fact that economic conditions are likely to be similar across state borders, while 
the effects of tax policies stop at a state’s border. This discontinuity in tax policy allows us to 
difference away any effects from unobserved confounding factors (e.g., social, economic, and 
political) that are centric to certain geographic locations. This test is a form of the sharp 
regression discontinuity approach (Dell, 2010). 
We identify a firm’s county according to its zip code from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. We re-estimate our main specification except that our treatment and 
control firms are now restricted to firms whose HQ are located within 10 miles of a state 
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border. Although this restrictive sample criterion significantly reduces our sample size to 
3,261 firm-year observations with 75 relocating firms (2.3%), the analysis facilitates 
inferences about the causal effect of tax rate changes by allowing a more economically 
similar group to be used as a counterfactual against which to compare the relatively more 
affected group. We present this analysis in Table 5, Panel C. Using logit, linear probability, 
and conditional logit (with firm fixed effects) models, we continue to find a positive 
significant effect of corporate tax rate changes on relocation likelihood.26 The coefficient is 
0.85 (t-statistic of 2.70), implying that a one-percentage-point decrease in state corporate 
income tax rate will decrease the likelihood of a cross-state HQ relocation by 134%. Note 
that the estimated sensitivities of corporate relocation to tax changes in both columns are 
substantially larger than the Table 3 baseline specification. One explanation is that narrowing 
the sample of control firms to those sharing arguably similar (regional) economic conditions 
removes heterogeneity driven by local economic conditions. Overall, these results lend 
further support to a causal interpretation of the relationship between tax changes and 
corporate relocation. 
5. Cross-sectional Analysis 
Our results thus far provide evidence that on average, decreases in the HQ state 
corporate tax rate lead to a significant reduction in the likelihood of firms’ cross-state HQ 
relocation. However, as hypothesized earlier, there are pre-existing conditions that could 
moderate this effect. In this section, we examine the following moderating factors: (i) the 
weight on the sales factor across states and (ii) the use of tax planning by firms. These 
conditions relate to the apportionment weight and the taxable income components in the state 
tax apportionment formula, respectively. To test these assertions, we extend Equation (4) by 
including an interaction between ΔHQ Corporate Tax and each condition measured at t-1: 
                                                 
26 We obtain qualitatively similar results using the conditional logit model (untabulated). One potential 
explanation is that the relatively small sample weakened the power of the test. 
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𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Δ𝐻𝑄 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2Δ𝐻𝑄 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑠,𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡                   (6) 
Note that Condition is measured at t-1 to capture the interaction effect of a pre-
existing condition (i.e., existing prior to any relocation) and corporate tax rate changes on the 
likelihood of HQ relocation. From a research design perspective, the use of an exogenous 
shock coupled with a pre-existing condition facilitates inferences about how this condition 
moderates an outcome driven by the shock. 
5.1. The moderating effect of sales factor weight 
As noted earlier, the state tax apportionment formula involves weights on three 
factors: sales, property, and payroll. States may change the weights placed on each factor 
over time. We obtain the yearly factor weights from Wolters Kluwer, CCH and state 
government websites.27 These time-series and cross-sectional variations in the factor weights 
provide a unique opportunity to further identify the effect of changes in corporate tax rates on 
a firm’s decision to relocate its HQ. For example, in 2010, 13 states and the District of 
Columbia used a three-factor apportionment formula that equally weighted sales, property, 
and payroll. Nineteen states double-weighted the sales factor (i.e., 50% on sales, 25% each on 
property and payroll). Nine states put 100% of the weight on sales factors, and five put more 
than 50% weight on sales factors. The other four states did not charge corporate income tax.28 
                                                 
27 Wolters Kluwer, CCH provides insightful industry-leading resources and step-by-step guidance on a wide 
variety of tax and accounting issues (https://www.cchgroup.com). The information on factor weights is obtained 
from http://tax.cchgroup.com/onlinestore/productimages/vol1-pages489-505.pdf.  
28 States that used an equally weighted three-factor apportionment formula throughout our sample period (1996–
2010) include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kansas, Oklahoma, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Rhode Island. States that used double-
weighted sales factors are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, 
and West Virginia. States that put 100% weight on sales throughout our sample period are Illinois, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, and Texas. Michigan (90%), Minnesota (75%), Ohio (60%), and 
Pennsylvania (60%) all assigned a higher weight to sales. Some states changed their factor weights during our 
sample period. Wisconsin (Arizona) gradually changed from a double-weighted sales formula in 2005 (2006) to 
an 80% weight on sales in 2006 (2009). Oregon (Georgia) moved from a double-weighted sales formula in 2003 
(2005) to a 100% weight on sales in 2006 (2008). Utah and Vermont each switched from an equally weighted 
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Over our sample period, nine states changed their factor weights, with all of the changes 
increasing the weight on the sales factor. We create an indicator variable, High Sales Weight, 
that is equal to one if a state places a weight of more than one third on the sales factor in the 
state tax apportionment formula at year t-1,and zero otherwise. 
 Equation (3) predicts that the positive association between a change in the HQ 
corporate tax rate and the likelihood of HQ relocation is moderated when there is a higher 
weight on the sales factor. Table 6 documents the results of our investigation into the effect 
of a higher weight on the sales factor on the relation between changes in corporate tax rates 
and HQ relocation. We find a negative and significant coefficient on High Sales Weight 
across all three specifications (t-statistics range from -1.93 to -2.43), suggesting that placing 
more weight on the sales factor can potentially provide state tax relief to businesses that have 
property and payroll in the state and thus reduce the likelihood of relocation out of state. 
Furthermore, the coefficients on ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate × High Sales Weight are negative 
in all three specifications and are statistically significant at the 5% level in two of the three 
specifications.29 These results suggest that firms whose state tax burden is partially reduced 
by the state apportionment formula are less responsive to changes in tax rates. Overall, the 
results support our theory. As noted earlier, one key reason that many states are placing a 
higher weight on the sales factor is to encourage the within-state location of business 
activities. Our evidence here provides further evidence of this (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; 
Goolsbee et al., 2001; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). 
5.2. The moderating effect of tax planning 
 State income tax liability could be manipulated when firms are able to reduce their 
taxable base by engaging in aggressive tax planning activities, such as the use of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
formula to a double weight on sales in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The remaining four states (Nevada, South 
Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming) did not impose state corporate income tax. 
29 The marginal effect of the interaction term from the logit model is significantly negative (-0.0092, z = -2.05).  
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Delaware-based tax avoidance strategy (Dyreng et al., 2013) within the U.S. or the use of 
multi-jurisdictional tax planning (Dyreng et al., 2015; Klassen and Laplante, 2012). As 
evident from the state tax apportionment formula, firms with a lower taxable income are 
subject to smaller effects from any changes in HQ state income tax rates, and hence such 
firms’ HQ relocation likelihood is less sensitive to changes in the HQ state corporate tax rate. 
To assess whether extant tax planning moderates the relation between tax rate changes 
and the likelihood of tax-driven HQ relocation, we consider two measures that can affect the 
tax base. First, we focus on the presence of aggressive state tax planning. We expect that 
firms with more state tax planning have less income that is subject to state taxes and are thus 
less responsive to shocks in state corporate tax rates. Dyreng et al. (2013) described a 
Delaware-based tax avoidance strategy (also known as Passive Investment Companies (PIC)) 
in which firms shift income into Delaware subsidiaries from other states to convert taxable 
income into tax-exempt income. This occurs because the income generated by intangible 
assets that are held in a Delaware corporation (e.g., royalty payments) are exempt from 
taxation. Dyreng et al. (2013) find that firms that own intangible assets and operate in states 
that have tax laws conducive to cross-state income shifting are more likely to adopt such a 
strategy, leading to a 15–24% decrease in the state income tax burden or a 1.04–1.47% 
increase in net income. In other words, Delaware acts as a domestic tax haven for some U.S. 
firms. Our first measure of aggressive tax planning is whether a firm uses domestic tax 
havens as defined in Dyreng et al. (2013).  
Because the PIC strategy is only effective when the HQ state allows separate 
reporting and does not require the addback of intercompany payments, we adjust our measure 
to account for this feature.30 Specifically, our PIC measure (PIC) is an indicator variable that 
                                                 
30 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. In states that allow separate reporting, firms are allowed 
to apportion the net profits of a single entity (i.e., they are not required to include the net profits of all domestic 
entities in the consolidated firm), which effectively enables firms to engage in a PIC strategy using 
intercompany transfers (Dyreng et al., 2013). 
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takes a value of one if (i) the old HQ state allows separate reporting and does not require the 
addback of intercompany payments, and (ii) if the following three conditions are satisfied 
(Dyreng et al. 2013): (1) the firm-year has a relatively large number of subsidiaries organized 
in separate filing states (ranked in the upper third of the sample) or a relatively large number 
of subsidiaries in states that do not invoke the economic nexus doctrine (ranked in the upper 
third of the sample), (2) the firm-year has a relatively large number of subsidiaries organized 
in Delaware (ranked in the upper third of the sample), and (3) the firm-year has relatively 
high intangible assets (an above-median market-to-book ratio).  
Studies have highlighted the difficulty in taxing multinational firms because 
jurisdictions struggle to determine economic sources of income (e.g., Dyreng and Lindsey, 
2009; Klassen and Laplante, 2012; De Simone, Mills, and Stomberg, 2015). Income-mobile 
firms, whose business operations and asset structures provide them with greater flexibility to 
avoid tax, may have greater opportunities for strategic cross-jurisdictional income shifting 
and the exploitation of other tax incentives. Following De Simone et al. (2015), our second 
measure of tax planning is Income Mobile, which is an indicator of firms that are associated 
with opportunities for income-mobile tax planning, which is constructed based on firms’ 
level of foreign sales, R&D expenditures, advertising expenditures, gross profit margin, and 
whether the firm is in a high-tech industry.  
We report the results on the moderating effect of aggressive tax planning using the 
two proxies in Panels A and B of Table 7. The lack of firm data on subsidiary locations 
reduces the sample used in this analysis to 17,826 firm-year observations, with 242 firms 
relocating their HQ (1.36%). Among the relocated firms, 133 (54%) relocated to a lower-tax 
state and 109 (45%) relocated to a higher-tax state. Panel A reports the results using PIC as a 
proxy of tax planning. We find that U.S. firms that may use the Delaware PIC strategy are 
less responsive to tax changes. The coefficients on the interaction terms ΔHQ Corporate Tax 
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Rate × PIC are all negative and significant at a 5% level (t-statistics range from -2.08 to  
-2.93), which is consistent with our prediction. To gauge the economic significance of the 
interaction effect, consider the marginal effect of the interaction term of -0.0276 with a z-
statistic of -2.54 (not tabulated).31 This moderating effect is significant enough to offset the 
increase in HQ relocation likelihood driven by HQ state tax increases. 
Our second proxy, Income Mobile, focuses on the extent to which firms can leverage 
their tax planning opportunities with their foreign operations to reduce state tax exposure. In 
Panel B of Table 7, the coefficients on the interaction terms (ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate × 
Income Mobile) are significantly negative across all three specifications, which is consistent 
with our prediction that the likelihood of HQ relocation for income-mobile firms is 
significantly less sensitive to state tax changes. The marginal effect of the interaction term 
from the logit model is -0.0051 with a z-statistic of -2.31 (not reported), implying that HQ 
state tax rate changes have a small but statistically significant effect on the likelihood of HQ 
relocation for income-mobile firms.  
Taking these findings together, it appears that firms that use multijurisdictional tax-
planning strategies to reduce taxable income are less responsive to changes in tax rates. That 
is, for a given level of economic activity, having less taxable income because of aggressive 
planning mitigates the effects of tax rate changes. 
6. Supplementary Analysis: Inbound Analysis of the Choice of Destination State 
 In our main analyses presented above, we focus on outbound relocations: how a 
change in the HQ state corporate tax rate affects HQ relocation out of the state. In this 
section, we provide some additional analysis based on inbound relocations—that is, how a 
change in the corporate tax rate in a state affects firms’ HQ relocation into the state. To 
analyze inbound relocations, we adopt a different research design because of the unique 
                                                 
31 The magnitude and the statistical significance of the interaction effects from the logit estimation are 
determined following Ai and Norton (2003).   
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challenges in matching a particular state’s tax rate changes with a firm’s decision about 
whether to relocate to the state. We focus on a sample of firms that relocated their HQ during 
our sample period. At each point in time, each relocating firm is exposed to 50 location 
choices (i.e., one for each state) outside the state in which it is currently located.32 Stated 
differently, a relocating firm chooses to move to one of 50 states or to Washington, D.C. 
based on various factors, including changes in corporate tax rates.33 There were 661 
relocations during our sample period, resulting in an initial sample of 33,050 (661*50) for the 
inbound analysis. Our dependent variable, D(Chosen), is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one for the state to which a firm relocates its HQ, and zero otherwise. We run a 
regression at the firm-state level and estimate the following logit regression: 
𝐷(𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1                            
+ 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−2            
                    + 𝛽5𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−3 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−3                          
                                    + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡                                                                                         (7) 
where i, s, and t index HQ relocating firms, states, and the year of relocation, respectively, 
and ΔState Tax Increase (Decrease) is an indicator variable that equals one for a state 
corporate income tax rate increase (decrease) in state s in year t-1, and zero otherwise. 
Similar variables are defined for years t-2 and t-3. We include control variables related to 
state-level tax, economic, and political factors as defined for Equation (4). In addition, we 
include control variables that capture the potential synergy a firm may receive from moving 
to a synergistic state. For example, high-tech firms may benefit by relocating to California, 
where there are many high-tech firms. Industry Match Top Market Cap (Industry Match Top 
Number) is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm is in one of the top 10 
industries in terms of market capitalization (measured by the number of firms) in the state. 
                                                 
32 In our analysis, we consider the 50 United States and Washington, D.C.  
33 Dyreng et al. (2015) adopt a similar research design in their analysis of U.S. multinationals’ choices of 
locations of foreign holding companies. 
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Existing Subsidiary Operation is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm has an existing 
subsidiary (based on Exhibit 21 disclosure in 10-K) in state s in year t-1.   
Table 8 presents the results for the inbound analysis. Column (1) reports the results 
without fixed effects, and we add year fixed effects in Column (2) and year and industry 
fixed effects in Column (3). We find that relocating firms are more likely to move to a state 
that has reduced state corporate tax rates in the year before relocation or has lower corporate 
tax rates. The coefficients on the one-year lagged tax decrease are positive and significant 
across all three specifications.  
7. Conclusion 
Corporate HQ relocations have significant economic consequences, not just for the 
firms themselves but also for the source and destination locations. Motivated by these 
consequences and the recent focus on corporate HQ relocation across states, we conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of tax-motivated HQ relocations within the U.S. 
by relying on exogenous changes in HQ state corporate tax rates as a quasi-experimental 
setting. The state corporate income tax rate changes, as opposed to changes in other state tax 
instruments, provide a strong setting for our research question because their staggered 
changes across time and states allow us to draw strong causal inferences on the effects of HQ 
state corporate tax changes. More importantly, by focusing on state corporate income tax 
changes, we can use the state apportionment formula as a theoretical foundation to make 
cross-sectional predictions that can further strengthen the identification of the effects of tax 
changes. 
We document strong and robust evidence that exogenous changes in HQ state 
corporate tax rates alter the likelihood of cross-state corporate HQ relocation. Further 
analyses show that the likelihood of HQ relocation in response to corporate tax changes is 
moderated by states’ tax policy on the factor weights under the state tax apportionment 
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formula because of the ability of firms to reduce state tax liabilities through various tax 
planning activities and by existing HQ states’ government efforts to provide incentives for 
certain firms to retain their HQ within the state.  
 Overall, our paper contributes to an improved understanding of the real effect of tax 
policies by providing evidence of the effects of changes in state corporate tax rates on firms’ 
relocation decisions and analysis of the relevant factors that could moderate such an effect. 
Our findings provide important insights into the economic consequences of state tax changes, 
which will be of interest to policy makers and state governments, particularly when states 
have incentives to engage in tax competition to retain or attract firms.  
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Appendix A List of State Corporate Tax Rate Changes 
State Year Description of changes in top corporate income tax rate No. of Sample firms 
VT 1997 Tax increase: from 8.25% to 9.75% 4   
CA 1997 Tax decrease: from 9.3% to 8.84% 410   
CT 1997 Tax decrease: from 10.75% to 10.5% 83   
NC 1997 Tax decrease: from 7.75% to 7.5% 47   
AZ 1998 Tax decrease: from 9% to 8% 51   
CT 1998 Tax decrease: from 10.5% to 9.5% 108   
NC 1998 Tax decrease: from 7.5% to 7.25% 59   
NH 1999 Tax increase: from 7% to 8% 22   
CO 1999 Tax decrease: from 5% to 4.75% 122   
CT 1999 Tax decrease: from 9.5% to 8.5% 96   
NC 1999 Tax decrease: from 7.25% to 7% 61   
NY 1999 Tax decrease: from 9% to 8.5% 399   
OH 1999 Tax decrease: from 8.9% to 8.5% 132   
AZ 2000 Tax decrease: from 8% to 7.968% 47   
CO 2000 Tax decrease: from 4.75% to 4.63% 120   
CT 2000 Tax decrease: from 8.5% to 7.5% 99   
NC 2000 Tax decrease: from 7% to 6.9% 53   
NY 2000 Tax decrease: from 8.5% to 8% 376   
AL 2001 Tax increase: from 5% to 6.5% 21   
NH 2001 Tax increase: from 8% to 8.5% 23   
AZ 2001 Tax decrease: from 7.968% to 6.968% 52   
ID 2001 Tax decrease: from 8% to 7.6% 8   
NY 2001 Tax decrease: from 8% to 7.5% 397   
CA 
 
2002 
 
Tax increase: suspension of state net operating loss 
(NOL) deduction* 
762   
 
NJ 
 
 
2002 
 
 
Tax increase: introduction of Alternative Minimum 
Assessment tax (AMT) and suspension of NOL 
deduction* 
183   
TN 2002 Tax increase: from 6% to 6.5% 55   
IN 2003 Tax increase: from 7.75% to 8.5% 41   
AR 
 
2003 
 
Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax 
surcharge of 3% on tax liability** 
   
CT 
 
2003 
 
Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax 
surcharge of 20% on tax liability** 
   
 
CT 
 
2004 
 
Tax increase: of corporate income tax surcharge from 
20% to 25% on tax liability** 
   
ND 2004 Tax decrease: from 10.5% to 7% 2   
AR 
 
2005 
 
Tax decrease: repeal of corporate income tax surcharge 
of 3% on tax liability** 
   
KY 2005 Tax decrease: from 8.25% to 7% 19   
CT 
 
2006 
 
Tax decrease: of corporate income tax surcharge from 
25% to 20% on tax liability** 
   
VT 2006 Tax decrease: from 9.75% to 8.9% 4   
ND 2007 Tax decrease: from 7% to 6.5% 3   
NY 2007 Tax decrease: from 7.5% to 7.1% 314   
VT 2007 Tax decrease: from 8.9% to 8.5% 4   
WV 2007 Tax decrease: from 9% to 8.75% 5   
CT 
 
2008 
 
Tax decrease: repeal of corporate income tax surcharge 
of 20% on tax liability** 
   
MD 2008 Tax increase: from 7% to 8.25% 57   
MI 
 
2008 
 
Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax with 
a top rate of 4.95% 
59   
KY 2008 Tax decrease: from 7% to 6% 20   
TX 
 
2008 
 
Tax decrease: abolition of income tax of 4.5% , 
replaced with gross receipts tax without interest 
deductibility 
316   
CT 2009 Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax 69   
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surcharge of 10% on tax liability for firms with 
revenue over $100 million** 
NC 
 
2009 
 
Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax 
surcharge of 3% on tax liability** 
51   
OH 
 
2009 
 
Tax decrease: from 8.5% to 0.26% (phase out of 
income tax from year 2005) 
98   
OR 2009 Tax increase: from 6.6% to 7.9% 29   
KS 2009 Tax decrease: in tax surcharge from 3.1% to 3.05%** 19   
ND 2009 Tax decrease: from 6.5% to 6.4% 3   
WV 2009 Tax decrease: from 8.75% to 8.5% 6   
      
* We exclude these two tax events (the suspension of the NOL deduction and the introduction of AMT), 
which are treated as tax increase events in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), from our main analysis because 
they cannot be quantifiable to a rate increase that applies to all firms. However, we include these two events 
as tax increase events (Tax Increase = 1) in the regression specification that uses indicator variables of tax 
changes as the dependent variables. 
 
**We exclude changes in the state tax surcharge rate from the analysis because such changes are usually 
temporary. However, in robustness checks, we find that our results are not affected by considering state tax 
surcharge rate changes. As a state tax surcharge is levied on tax liability, we estimate the effect on the state 
corporate income tax rate by multiplying the change in the tax surcharge rate by the top corporate income tax 
rate of the state. 
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Appendix B Variable Definitions 
Variable Definitions and Construction 
  
State Tax Factors  
  
Relocation Indicator coded as 1 if the firm’s headquarters relocates to a different state 
between year t-1 and year t, and 0 otherwise. Historical corporate 
headquarters location information is obtained from Professor Bill 
McDonald’s website at http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10-K_Headers/10-
K_Headers.html. 
  
∆HQ Corporate Tax Rate (%) Change in the firm’s HQ state corporate income tax rate in percentage points 
from year t-2 to year t-1 measured as the tax rate in t-1 minus the tax rate in 
t-2. 
  
HQ Corporate Tax Rate (%) The firm’s HQ state corporate tax rate at t-1. Historical corporate tax rate 
data are obtained from several sources, including the Tax Foundation and the 
appendix in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015). 
  
HQ Tax Increase Indicator coded as 1 if there is an increase in the top state statutory tax rate in 
year t-1 in the firm’s HQ state. 
  
HQ Tax Decrease Indicator coded as 1 if there is a decrease in the top state statutory tax rate in 
year t-1 in the firm’s HQ state. 
  
Scaled Benefits from HQ State Annual benefits received from the HQ state in year t-1 scaled by the firm pre-
tax domestic income in the same year times 100. Pre-tax worldwide income 
is used if pre-tax domestic income information is missing. Observations with 
a negative denominator are coded as zero. Annual benefits are equal to the 
total value of the special tax treatment divided by the duration of the 
treatment in years. (Good Jobs First’s Subsidy Tracker database) 
  
HQ High Sales Factor Weight Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm’s HQ state tax apportionment factor 
weight on sales is greater than one-third in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
Information on historical state apportionment formulas is collected from 
several sources, including Wolters Kluwer, CCH and state government 
websites. 
  
R&D Tax Credits (%) The rate, in percentage points, of a firm’s R&D expenditures deductible from 
its state corporate income tax liability offered by the HQ state in year t-1 
(Wilson, 2007; Department of Revenue websites). 
  
Job Creation Tax Credits Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm’s HQ state offers tax credits for firms 
hiring new workers in year t-1, and 0 otherwise (Neumark and Grijalva, 
2013). 
  
Bonus Depreciation Deduction 
(%) 
The rate, in percentage points, of the additional first-year (bonus) 
depreciation deduction in year t-1 offered by the firm’s HQ state. For 
example, the variable is coded as 1 if full additional first-year depreciation 
deduction is allowed, 0.3 if 30% is allowed, and 0 if none is allowed. 
  
HQ Capital Gains Tax Rate (%) The firm’s HQ state tax rate, in percentage points, on long-term capital gains 
in year t-1 in the state (http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/). 
  
HQ Personal Tax Rate (%) The firm’s HQ state’s maximum tax rate, in percentage points, on wage 
income in year t-1 in the state for an additional $1,000 of income on an initial 
$1,500,000 of wage income (split evenly between husband and wife). The 
taxpayer is assumed to be married and filing jointly 
(http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/). 
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Firm-level Economic Factors  
  
∆Leverage Change in long-term leverage from year t-2 to year t-1. Long-term book 
leverage is measured as long-term debt (Compustat: dltt) over lagged total 
assets (Compustat: at). 
  
∆ROA Change in return on assets from year t-2 to year t-1. Return on assets is 
measured as operating income before depreciation (Compustat: oibdp) over 
lagged total assets (Compustat: at). 
  
∆Firm Size Change in firm size from year t-2 to year t-1. Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat: at). 
  
∆Market-to-Book Change in the market-to-book ratio from year t-2 to year t-1. The market-to-
book ratio is measured as the market value of equity over total assets 
(Compustat: at), where the market value of equity is defined as 
[fiscal year-end closing price * number of common shares used in earnings 
per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-
term debt – deferred taxes and investment tax credits] 
(Compustat: prcc_f*cshpri + pstkl + dltt + dlc – txditc). 
  
∆Sales Change in sales from year t-2 to year t-1. Sales is measured as sales 
(Compustat: sale) over lagged total assets (Compustat: at). 
  
∆R&D Change in R&D intensity from year t-2 to year t-1. R&D intensity is 
measured as R&D expenditures (Compustat: xrd) over lagged total assets 
(Compustat: at). 
  
∆PPE Change in capital intensity from year t-2 to year t-1. Capital intensity is 
measured as net PPE (Compustat: ppent) over lagged total assets (Compustat: 
at). 
  
∆Intangible Change in intangibility from year t-2 to year t-1. Intangibility is measured as 
intangible assets (Compustat: intan) over lagged total assets (Compustat: at). 
  
∆Foreign Change in income from foreign operations from year t-2 to year t-1. Income 
from foreign operations is measured as pre-tax foreign income (Compustat: 
pifo) over lagged total assets (Compustat: at). 
  
∆Employee Change in the number of employees from year t-2 to year t-1. Information 
about the total number of employees is obtained from Compustat 
(Compustat: emp). 
  
Delaware Incorporated Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm was incorporated in Delaware in year 
t-1, and 0 otherwise (Compustat: stinc). 
  
Restructure Restructure indicator coded as 1 if the firm has non-zero restructuring 
charges (Compustat: rcp) in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
  
Separate Filing Indicator variable coded as 1 if the state allows separate filing, and 0 
otherwise. Historical state tax information is obtained from several sources, 
including the state governments’ websites, the Tax Foundation, and Tax 
Analysts. 
  
PIC PIC variable, a proxy for firms’ use of Delaware-based passive investment 
company tax avoidance strategies (Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock, 2013).  
PIC is an indicator coded as 1 if the firm’s headquartered state allows 
separate reporting and does not require the addback of intercompany 
payments and either PIC Separate = 1 or PIC NoNexus = 1, and 0 otherwise. 
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The variables PIC Separate and PIC NoNexus are defined below. 
  
PIC Separate PIC Separate variable, a proxy for firms’ use of Delaware-based passive 
investment company tax avoidance strategies based on Dyreng, Lindsey, and 
Thornock (2013). PIC Separate is an indicator coded as 1 if three conditions 
are met: (i) the firm-year ranks in the upper third of the sample in the number 
of subsidiaries in separate filing states, (ii) the firm-year ranks in the upper 
third of the sample in the number of subsidiaries in Delaware, and (iii) the 
firm-year has an above-median market-to-book ratio. Firms’ state-level 
subsidiary information based on their Exhibit 21 disclosures is collected from 
Scott Dyreng’s website. 
  
PIC NoNexus PIC NoNexus variable, a proxy for firms’ use of Delaware-based passive 
investment company tax avoidance strategies based on Dyreng, Lindsey, and 
Thornock (2013). PIC NoNexus is an indicator coded as 1 if three conditions 
are met: (i) the firm-year ranks in the upper third of the sample in the number 
of subsidiaries in states that do not invoke the economic nexus doctrine, (ii) 
the firm-year ranks in the upper third of the sample in the number of 
subsidiaries in Delaware, and (iii) the firm-year has an above-median market-
to-book ratio. Firms’ state-level subsidiary information based on their Exhibit 
21 disclosures is collected from Scott Dyreng’s website. 
  
Income Mobile Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm is classified as an income-mobile 
firm based on the following firm characteristics: foreign income, R&D 
intensity, advertising spending, profitability, and membership in a high-tech 
industry (De Simone, Mills, and Stomberg, 2015), and 0 otherwise. 
  
State Economic Factors  
  
ΔReal GSP (%) Real gross state product annual growth rate, defined as the state’s real GDP 
at t-1 minus that in t-2 divided by the state’s real GDP in t-2 times 100 (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
  
∆Unemployment Rate (%) Change in state unemployment rate in percentage points (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics). 
  
∆Unionization Change in state unionization. State unionization is measured as the fraction 
of private-sector employees who belong to a labor union in year t-1 in the 
state (http://www.unionstats.com/). 
  
∆Unemployment Benefits Change in state unemployment benefits. State unemployment benefits are 
measured as the maximum weekly payment (thousands) times the maximum 
number of qualifying weeks in year t-1 in the state (U.S. Department of 
Labor). 
  
Immobile Capital Total gross state product from Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, and Mining 
divided by total state private industry GSP in year t-1 based on Omer and 
Shelley (1998) (U.S. Census Bureau).  
  
State Private GSP 
 
The residual from regressing state private industry GSP on Immobile Capital 
and State-to-Region Private GSP based on Omer and Shelley (1998). State-
to-Region Private GSP is defined below (U.S. Census Bureau). 
  
State-to-Region Private GSP 
 
State private industry GSP (millions) divided by private industry GSP for 
BEA region in year t-1 based on Omer and Shelley (1998) (U.S. Census 
Bureau). 
  
State-to-Region Personal 
Income 
State per-capita income divided by total per-capita income for the BEA 
region in year t-1 based on Omer and Shelley (1998) (U.S. Census Bureau). 
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State-to-Nation Personal 
Income 
 
 
The residual from regressing the ratio of state total personal income to U.S. 
total personal income on Immobile Capital based on Omer and Shelley 
(1998) (U.S. Census Bureau). 
Budget Balance 
 
State budget balance (U.S. Census Bureau). 
  
Credit Downgrades 
 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the state’s credit rating is downgraded by 
either S&P or Moody’s in year t-1 (Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s). 
  
ΔCredit Ratings 
 
Change in the state’s credit rating by either S&P or Moody’s in year t-1 
(Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s). 
  
State Political Factors  
  
Tax-Expenditure Limits 
 
 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the state operates under a tax or expenditure 
limitation in year t-1 and 0 , (National Conference of State Legislatures). 
  
Supermajority Vote 
 
 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the state a state requires a supermajority vote 
for a tax increase in year t-1, and 0 otherwise (Knight, 2000 and National 
Conference of State Legislatures). 
  
Democratic Governor 
 
 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the state is governed by a Democratic 
governor in year t-1, and 0 otherwise (Congressional Quarterly and state 
election websites). 
  
Tax Dependence 
 
 
Total corporate income plus total property taxes collected divided by the total 
state tax revenue of the state in year t-1 based on Omer and Shelley (1998) 
(U.S. Census Bureau). 
  
No. of Bordering States The number of neighboring states of the state. 
  
Bordering States Tax Diff 
 
The difference between a state’s corporate income tax rate and the highest 
corporate income tax rate of any of its neighboring states (in percentage 
points). 
  
No. Bordering States Tax 
Increase 
 
The number of neighboring states of the state that increased their corporate 
income tax rate in year t-1. 
  
No. Bordering States Tax 
Decrease 
 
The number of neighboring states of the state that decreased their corporate 
income tax rate in year t-1. 
  
Years to State Election Election cycle, defined as the number of years until the next state election. 
  
Firm–State Synergistic Factors  
  
Existing Subsidiary Operations 
 
 
 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm has at least one existing subsidiary 
operation in year t-1 in the state. Firms’ state-level subsidiary information 
based on their Exhibit 21 disclosures is collected from Scott Dyreng’s 
website. 
  
Industry Match Top Market 
Cap 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm’s primary industry is the same as the 
top industry cluster in year t-1 in the state. A state’s top industry cluster is 
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defined as the industry with the largest value of market capitalization of firms 
headquartered in the state. Industry classification is based on two-digit SIC 
codes. 
  
Industry Match Top Number 
 
 
 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm’s primary industry is the same as the 
top industry cluster in year t-1 in the state. A state’s top industry cluster is 
defined as the industry with the largest number of firms headquartered in the 
state. Industry classification is based on two-digit SIC codes.  
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Figure 1 Timeline illustrating regression specification 
 
  
 
t – 2 t – 1 t 
Relocation = 1 if a firm relocates its 
headquarters to another state between year t-1 
and year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Δ State Corporate Tax Rate   
   Control variables: 
   Δ HQ State characteristics 
   Δ Firm characteristics Control variables: 
HQ state-level characteristics 
Firm-level characteristics 
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Table 1 HQ Relocation by Year 
This table tabulates the number of firms that engage in HQ relocation broken down by direction  
(i.e., to a lower- or higher-/same-tax state) by year. 
Year Relocation = 0 Relocation = 1 Relocation = 1 Total Percent  
   higher/same tax lower tax  relocating 
1998 2,163 56 29 27 2,219 2.52 
1999 3,192 70 34 36 3,262 2.15 
2000 2,785 72 34 38 2,857 2.52 
2001 3,038 55 26 29 3,093 1.78 
2002 3,087 57 26 31 3,144 1.81 
2003 3,105 66 32 34 3,171 2.08 
2004 2,679 58 25 33 2,737 2.12 
2005 2,866 45 28 17 2,911 1.55 
2006 2,707 41 17 24 2,748 1.49 
2007 2,615 34 17 17 2,649 1.28 
2008 2,451 37 21 16 2,488 1.49 
2009 2,379 31 12 19 2,410 1.29 
2010 2,291 39 14 25 2,330 1.67 
Total 35,358 661 315 (47%) 346 (53%) 36,019 1.84 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. All of the variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
Variables Mean StDev Q1 Median Q3  
Relocation (1/0) 0.018 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.000  
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate (%) -0.029 0.672 0.000 0.000 0.000  
HQ Corporate Tax Rate (%) 6.991 2.816 5.500 7.900 8.840  
Scaled Benefits from HQ State (%) 0.023 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000  
HQ High Sales Factor Weight (1/0) 0.288 0.453 0.000 0.000 1.000  
R&D Tax Credits (%) 6.319 5.641 0.000 6.000 10.00  
Job Creation Tax Credits (1/0) 0.740 0.439 0.000 1.000 1.000  
Bonus Depreciation Deduction (%) 11.70 30.62 0.000 0.000 0.000  
ΔHQ Capital Gains Tax Rate (%) 0.004 1.258 0.000 0.000 0.020  
ΔHQ Personal Tax Rate (%) -0.028 0.617 0.000 0.000 0.000  
       
Firm-level Economic Factors       
ΔLeverage -0.004 0.117 -0.032 0.000 0.015  
ΔROA -0.005 0.143 -0.053 -0.002 0.039  
ΔFirm Size 0.055 0.367 -0.074 0.036 0.159  
ΔMarket-to-Book -0.321 6.466 -0.513 0.000 0.347  
ΔSales -0.031 0.324 -0.141 0.000 0.114  
ΔR&D -0.003 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000  
ΔPPE -0.014 0.068 -0.030 -0.002 0.019  
ΔIntangibles -0.475 0.455 -0.923 -0.638 0.000  
ΔForeign 0.004 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000  
ΔEmployee 0.187 4.426 -0.027 0.001 0.093  
Delaware Incorporated (1/0) 0.537 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000  
Restructure (1/0) 0.137 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Separate Filing (1/0) 0.611 0.487 0.000 1.000 1.000  
PIC (1/0) 0.052 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Income Mobile (1/0) 0.106 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.000  
       
State Economic Factors       
ΔReal GSP (%) 2.634 2.877 1.008 2.661 4.590  
ΔUnemployment Rate (%) 0.235 1.101 -0.483 -0.117 0.647  
ΔUnionization -0.002 0.020 -0.007 -0.002 0.004  
ΔUnemployment Benefits 0.373 0.781 0.000 0.234 0.520  
Immobile Capital 0.025 0.032 0.007 0.017 0.026  
State Private GSP 0.218 0.308 0.033 0.151 0.365  
State-to-Region Private GSP 0.374 0.241 0.192 0.292 0.709  
State-to-Nation Personal Income 0.011 0.041 -0.023 -0.058 0.032  
State-to-Region Personal Income 1.019 0.076 0.987 1.019 1.073  
Budget Balance (billions) -11.00 13.97 -35.20 -5.330 -2.410  
Credit Downgrades (1/0) 0.070 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000  
ΔCredit Ratings 0.055 0.555 0.000 0.000 0.000  
       
State Political Factors       
Tax-Expenditures Limits (1/0) 0.632 0.482 0.000 1.000 1.000  
Supermajority Vote (1/0) 0.331 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000  
Democratic Governor (1/0) 0.325 0.469 0.000 0.000 1.000  
Tax Dependence 0.348 0.069 0.302 0.336 0.386  
No. of Bordering States 4.295 1.511 3.000 4.000 5.000  
Bordering States Tax Diff (%) 8.894 1.623 7.810 9.00 9.99  
No. Bordering States Tax Increase 0.146 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000  
No. Bordering States Tax Decrease 0.342 0.568 0.000 0.000 1.000  
Years to State Election 1.447 1.101 0.000 1.000 2.000  
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Table 3 The Effect of Corporate Tax Rate Changes on HQ Relocation 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the regressions that examine the effect of corporate tax rate changes on the 
likelihood of HQ relocation. Intercepts are included but are unreported. All of the variables are defined in the Appendix. z-
statistics are reported in brackets in columns 1 and 3 and t-statistics are reported in column 2. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the state of location level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance (two-
sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  (1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Linear Probability 
(3) 
Conditional Logit 
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  0.1866*** 0.0030** 0.1728* 
  (3.67) (2.21) (1.81) 
HQ Corporate Tax Rate  0.1251* 0.0036 0.1264*** 
  (1.70) (1.53) (3.10) 
HQ High Sales Factor Weight  -0.2919 -0.0076 -0.2110 
  (-0.60) (-0.86) (-1.03) 
R&D Tax Credits  -0.044 -0.0012 -0.0239 
  (-0.60) (-0.60) (-1.18) 
Job Creation Tax Credits  0.1014 0.0016 0.2860 
  (0.15) (0.09) (0.96) 
Bonus Depreciation Deduction  -0.0016 -0.0000 0.0012 
  (-0.21) (-0.04) (0.41) 
ΔHQ Capital Gains Tax Rate  0.0925 0.0023 0.0188 
  (0.94) (0.82) (0.81) 
ΔHQ Personal Tax Rate  0.0746 0.0023 0.0166 
  (1.01) (0.96) (0.51) 
Firm-level Economic Factors        
        
ΔLeverage  0.4217 0.0129 0.1735 
  (1.14) (1.56) (0.46) 
ΔROA  0.0730 0.0055 0.2375 
  (0.22) (0.74) (0.90) 
ΔFirm Size  0.4150*** 0.0111*** 0.4134*** 
  (3.51) (3.26) (3.95) 
ΔMarket-to-Book  -0.0629* 0.0001 -0.0021 
  (-1.95) (0.13) (-0.07) 
ΔSales  0.0006*** 0.0001** 0.0004** 
  (3.40) (2.52) (2.32) 
ΔR&D  -0.0027 -0.0001 -0.0002 
  (-1.17) (-1.18) (-0.30) 
ΔPPE  -2.6308*** -0.0535*** -1.5850** 
  (-4.77) (-3.84) (-2.18) 
ΔIntangibles  1.7069*** -0.0001 0.6329 
  (5.47) (-0.14) (1.28) 
ΔForeign  0.3073 0.0035 0.0968 
  (0.44) (0.29) (0.10) 
ΔEmployee  -0.0115 -0.0002 -0.0089 
  (-0.96) (-0.72) (-0.57) 
Delaware Incorporated  0.1164 0.0022 -1.5536*** 
  (1.19) (1.18) (-4.24) 
Restructure  0.2560** 0.0050*** 0.5072** 
  (2.33) (2.70) (2.53) 
State Economic Factors        
        
ΔReal GSP  -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0046 
  (-0.38) (-0.97) (-1.45) 
ΔUnemployment Rate  -0.0277 -0.0005 -0.059 
  (-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.58) 
ΔUnionization  11.111 -0.0106 0.7253 
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  (0.16) (-0.04) (0.36) 
ΔUnemployment Benefits  0.0271 0.0266 0.0091 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.05) 
Immobile Capital  -0.0897 0.0098 -0.5506 
  (-0.02) (0.06) (-0.17) 
State Private GSP  0.0042 0.0001 -0.0002 
  (0.48) (0.40) (-0.03) 
State-to-Region Private GSP  0.6974 0.0018 -0.0878 
  (0.45) (0.04) (-0.15) 
State-to-Nation Personal Income  -0.0030 -0.0000 -0.0003*** 
  (-1.10) (-1.04) (-2.83) 
State-to-Region Personal Income  -0.6669 -0.0473 -2.0352 
  (-0.28) (-0.51) (-1.36) 
State Budget Balance  -0.027 -0.000 -0.043* 
  (-0.79) (-0.83) (-2.01) 
Credit Downgrades  -0.0559 -0.0019 0.0515 
  (-0.12) (-0.20) (0.16) 
ΔCredit Ratings  -0.1508 -0.0026 -0.0536 
  (-1.14) (-1.00) (-0.40) 
State Political Factors        
        
Tax-Expenditures Limits  -0.2220 -0.0016 -0.0770 
  (-0.36) (-0.11) (-0.31) 
Supermajority Vote  0.2182 0.0023 0.1550 
  (0.33) (0.12) (0.60) 
Democratic Governor  -0.0540 -0.0013 0.0946 
  (-0.35) (-0.47) (0.63) 
Tax Dependence  -2.4241 -0.0696 -0.9466 
  (-0.83) (-0.91) (-0.65) 
No. Bordering States  -0.0699 -0.0025 0.0350 
  (-0.35) (-0.40) (0.45) 
Bordering States Tax Diff  -0.1835 -0.004032 -0.1944** 
  (-0.86) (-0.78) (-2.44) 
No. Bordering States Tax 
Increase  -0.0315 -0.0010 0.0619 
  (-0.19) (-0.32) (0.37) 
No. Bordering States Tax 
Decrease  0.0862 0.0013 -0.1049 
  (0.67) (0.55) (-0.93) 
Years to State Election  -0.0211 -0.0006 -0.0281 
  (-0.44) (-0.57) (-0.48) 
     
Fixed Effects  Industry + State + Year Industry + State + Year Firm + Year 
Pseudo R-squared  0.067 - 0.077 
Area under ROC  0.759 - - 
Adjusted R-squared  - 0.021 - 
Observations  36,019 36,019 3,473 
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Table 4 The Effect of Firm-Specific Special Tax Treatments from HQ States 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the effects of firms receiving special tax treatments or subsidies from their HQ 
state on the likelihood of HQ relocation. Intercepts are included but are unreported. All of the regressions contain the same 
set of control variables as in Table 3. All of the variables are defined in the Appendix. z-statistics are reported in brackets in 
columns 1 and 3 and t-statistics are reported in column 2. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are 
clustered at the state of location level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance (two-sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
  (1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Linear Probability 
(3) 
Conditional Logit 
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate (a) -0.4906*** -0.0057* -23.912* 
× Scaled Benefits from HQ State  (-4.08) (-1.84) (-1.74) 
     
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate (b) 0.2129*** 0.0032** 0.2044** 
  (3.85) (2.36) (2.08) 
Scaled Benefits from HQ State  -1.4723** -0.0141*** -4.3433** 
  (-2.37) (-4.70) (-2.20) 
Test of (a) + (b) 
 -0.2777** -0.0025 -23.711* 
 
 (-2.08) (-0.73) (-1.71) 
     
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects  Industry + State + Year Industry + State + Year Firm + Year 
Pseudo R-squared  0.077 - 0.088 
Area under ROC  0.762 - - 
Adjusted R-squared  - 0.019 - 
Observations  36,019 36,019 3,473 
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Table 5 Robustness Tests 
 
Panel A reports the coefficient estimates of the effects of a tax increase and a tax decrease on the likelihood of HQ 
relocation. Panel B examines the parallel trend assumption. Panel C reports the results for border state analysis, where we 
restrict our sample to firms that are located in counties within 10 miles of a state border. All of the regressions contain the 
same set of control variables as in Table 3. All of the variables are defined in the Appendix. z-statistics are reported in 
brackets in columns 1 and 3 and t-statistics are reported in column 2. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
are clustered at the state of location level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance (two-sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A Responses to HQ State Tax Rate Increases and Decreases 
  (1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Linear Probability 
(3) 
Conditional Logit 
HQ Tax Increase t–1  0.6411** 0.0116** 0.8037* 
  (2.13) (2.41) (1.72) 
HQ Tax Decrease t–1  -1.7612*** -0.0155* -1.4839* 
  (-3.25) (-1.89) (-1.69) 
     
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects  Industry + State + Year Industry + State + Year Firm + Year 
Pseudo R-squared  0.066 - 0.077 
Area under ROC  0.754 - - 
Adjusted R-squared  - 0.019 - 
Observations  36,019 36,019 3,470 
     
Panel B Parallel Trend Assumption 
  (1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Linear Probability 
(3) 
Conditional Logit 
HQ Tax Increase t–2  0.0889 0.0013 -0.0518 
  (0.23) (0.21) (-0.14) 
HQ Tax Increase t–1  0.7698** 0.0149** 1.4899*** 
  (2.32) (2.28) (2.82) 
HQ Tax Increase t  -0.0811 0.0045 0.7611 
  (-0.30) (0.36) (1.51) 
HQ Tax Increase t+1  -0.0465 -0.0016 -0.5004 
  (-0.08) (-0.20) (-1.43) 
HQ Tax Increase t+2  0.1409 0.0010 -0.2325 
  (0.34) (0.15) (-0.82) 
HQ Tax Decrease t–2  -0.1180 -0.0024 -0.0059 
  (-0.73) (-0.66) (-0.06) 
HQ Tax Decrease t–1  -2.3785*** -0.0207** -1.8439** 
  (-3.06) (-2.07) (-1.98) 
HQ Tax Decrease t  0.4318 -0.0128 -0.8911 
  (1.19) (-1.02) (-1.14) 
HQ Tax Decrease t+1  -0.0028 0.0029 0.1103 
  (-0.01) (0.31) (0.45) 
HQ Tax Decrease t+2  -0.1814 -0.0039 0.0066 
  (-0.56) (-0.58) (0.03) 
     
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects  Industry + State + Year Industry + State + Year Firm + Year 
Pseudo R-squared  0.071 - 0.103 
Area under ROC  0.761 - - 
Adjusted R-squared  - 0.020 - 
Observations  31,854 31,854 2,733 
  
55 
 
     
Panel C Border State Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Logit Linear Probability Conditional Logit 
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  0.8468*** 0.0142** 2.327* 
  (2.70) (2.50) (1.75) 
     
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects  Industry + State + Year Industry + State + Year Industry + State + Year 
Pseudo R-squared  0.266 - 0.523 
Area under ROC  0.864 - - 
Adjusted R-squared  - 0.112 - 
Observations  3,261 3,261 290 
     
  
56 
 
Table 6 Cross-sectional Analysis: Sales Factor Weight in Income Apportionment 
Formula 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the moderating effect of sales factor weight on the likelihood of HQ relocation. 
All of the regressions contain the same set of control variables as in Table 3. All of the variables are defined in the 
Appendix. z-statistics are reported in brackets in columns 1 and 3 and t-statistics are reported in column 2. Standard errors 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the state of location level. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance (two-sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
       
  (1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Linear Probability 
(3) 
Conditional Logit 
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate (a) -0.5697** -0.0037** -0.9874 
× HQ High Sales Factor Weight  (-2.08) (-2.33) (-1.52) 
     
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate (b) 0.3076*** 0.0056*** 0.3945** 
  (5.31) (3.89) (2.48) 
HQ High Sales Factor Weight  -0.2996** -0.0059** -0.4587* 
  (-2.43) (-2.03) (-1.93) 
Test of (a) + (b) 
 -0.2621 0.0019 -0.5929 
  (-0.93) (0.88) (-0.87) 
     
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects  Industry + State + Year Industry + State + Year Firm + Year 
Pseudo R-squared  0.071 - 0.081 
Area under ROC  0.748 - - 
Adjusted R-squared  - 0.024 - 
Observations  36,019 36,019 3,473 
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Table 7 Cross-sectional Analysis: Aggressive Tax Planning Opportunities 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the estimation of the moderating effect of tax planning on the likelihood of HQ 
relocation. We use aggressive state tax planning (i.e., passive investment companies, or PIC) and income mobility to 
measure tax planning activities in Panels A and B, respectively. All of the regressions contain the same set of control 
variables as in Table 3. All of the variables are defined in the Appendix. z-statistics are reported in brackets in columns 1 and 
3 and t-statistics are reported in column 2. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the state 
of location level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance (two-sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A Aggressive State Tax Planning 
  (1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Linear Probability 
(3) 
Conditional Logit 
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  (a) -1.8651*** -0.0075** -7.3307** 
× PIC  (-2.93) (-2.08) (-2.45) 
     
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate (b) 0.3912*** 0.0040* 0.5319*** 
  (4.68) (1.84) (2.79) 
PIC  0.1765 0.0038 0.8246 
  (0.68) (1.02) (1.45) 
Test of (a) + (b) 
 -1.4739** -0.0035 -6.7988** 
  (-2.28) (-0.82) (-2.25) 
     
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects  Industry + State + Year Industry + State + Year Firm + Year 
Pseudo R-squared  0.104 - 0.201 
Area under ROC  0.769 - - 
Adjusted R-squared  - 0.024 - 
Observations  17,826 17,826 1,018 
     
Panel B Income-Mobile Firms 
  (1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Linear Probability 
(3) 
Conditional Logit 
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate (a) -0.3415** -0.0033** -0.8309** 
× Income Mobile  (-2.43) (-1.96) (-2.43) 
     
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate (b) 0.2419*** 0.0031*** 0.2190** 
  (4.59) (3.19) (2.10) 
Income Mobile  -0.5288** -0.0098*** 0.2923 
  (-2.57) (-3.80) (1.01) 
Test of (a) + (b) 
 -0.0996 -0.0002 -0.6119* 
  (-0.65) (-0.10) (-1.70) 
     
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects  Industry + State + Year Industry + State + Year Firm + Year 
Pseudo R-squared  0.071 - 0.079 
Area under ROC  0.758 - - 
Adjusted R-squared  - 0.018 - 
Observations  36,019 36,019 3,473 
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Table 8 Inbound Analysis: Determinants of HQ Destination State for Relocating Firms  
This table reports the results of the logistic regressions that examine the determinants of the HQ destination state for 
relocating firms. Intercepts are included but are unreported. All of the variables are defined in the Appendix. z-statistics are 
reported in brackets in columns 1 and 3 and t-statistics are reported in column 2. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the relocating firm level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance (two-sided) 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
     
  (1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Linear Probability 
(3) 
Conditional Logit 
State Tax Factors     
     
State Tax Increase t–1  0.1793 0.0013 0.1246 
  (1.14) (0.35) (0.73) 
State Tax Decrease t–1  0.2623** 0.0061** 0.2416** 
  (2.45) (2.16) (2.09) 
State Tax Increase t–2  -0.0373 -0.0048 -0.0512 
  (-0.23) (-0.83) (-0.30) 
State Tax Decrease t–2  0.0667 0.0043 0.0640 
  (0.66) (1.56) (0.59) 
State Tax Increase t–3  -0.0797 -0.0033 -0.0912 
  (-0.49) (-0.87) (-0.52) 
State Tax Decrease t–3  -0.0896 -0.0052 -0.1299 
  (-0.77) (-0.53) (-1.04) 
State Corporate Tax Rate  -0.0489*** 0.0005 -0.0511*** 
  (-3.10) (1.53) (-2.97) 
State High Sales Factor Weight  -0.0636*** -0.0004*** -0.0580*** 
  (-3.27) (-4.34) (-2.93) 
R&D Tax Credits  0.0084*** 0.0002** 0.0109*** 
  (4.14) (2.00) (5.83) 
Job Creation Tax Credits  0.0827 0.0085*** 0.1602 
  (0.75) (3.26) (1.22) 
Bonus Depreciation Deduction  0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0011*** 
  (3.20) (0.97) (3.29) 
State Capital Gains Tax Rate  -0.0980*** -0.0013** -0.0800*** 
  (-3.24) (-2.20) (-2.60) 
State Personal Tax Rate  0.1287*** 0.0017*** 0.1073*** 
  (4.25) (2.88) (3.51) 
Separate Filing  0.2510*** 0.0078*** 0.2086** 
  (2.95) (4.42) (2.24) 
     
Firm-State Synergistic Factors     
     
Existing Subsidiary Operations  0.0274 -0.0002 0.0102 
  (0.67) (-0.13) (0.26) 
Industry Match Top Market Cap  0.1212 0.0083** -0.0336 
  (1.04) (2.52) (-0.26) 
Industry Match Top Number  0.8774*** 0.0274*** 1.6268*** 
  (11.53) (9.76) (13.28) 
State Economic Factors      
      
ΔReal GSP  1.3123 0.0010*** 2.9432 
  (0.96) (3.01) (1.57) 
Unemployment Rate  1.8032 0.0014* 0.3099 
  (0.56) (1.79) (0.07) 
Unionization  -0.0212 -0.0001 -0.1434 
  (-0.02) (-0.32) (-0.15) 
Unemployment Benefits  -0.0044* -0.0000*** -0.0038** 
  (-1.89) (-7.81) (-2.46) 
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Immobile Capital  -2.9018** 0.0166 -2.8463* 
  (-2.10) (1.02) (-1.88) 
State Private GSP  0.0023* 0.0000 0.0012 
  (1.90) (0.53) (1.21) 
State-to-Region Private GSP  1.1499*** 0.1042*** 1.0437** 
  (3.23) (11.90) (2.48) 
State-to-Nation Personal Income  0.7470 0.0224** 0.4572 
  (1.33) (1.99) (0.71) 
State-to-Region Personal Income  0.0001* 0.0000** 0.0001** 
  (1.91) (2.20) (2.17) 
ΔBudget Balance  -0.0082 -0.0017*** 0.0071 
  (-1.42) (-9.38) (1.33) 
ΔCredit Ratings  0.0784 0.0054*** 0.1081 
  (1.29) (3.05) (1.57) 
State Political Factors      
      
Tax-Expenditures Limits  0.1478 -0.0028* 0.1483 
  (1.58) (-1.65) (1.53) 
Supermajority Vote  -0.3191*** -0.0020 -0.2590** 
  (-3.03) (-0.99) (-2.34) 
Democratic Governor  0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0045 
  (0.01) (-0.10) (-0.07) 
Tax Dependence  1.1707** 0.0400*** 1.2814** 
  (2.29) (5.19) (2.47) 
No. Bordering States  0.0056 -0.0033*** 0.0133 
  (0.24) (-8.10) (0.55) 
     
Fixed Effects  Year Year Year + Industry 
Pseudo R-squared  0.151 - 0.161 
Area under ROC  0.822 - - 
Adjusted R-squared  - 0.154 - 
Observations  33,050 33,050 33,050 
    
 
 
 
